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Although there were almost 3.5 million reported information breaches of health care data 
in the first quarter of 2019, health care providers do not know the extent of digital and 
nondigital breaches of patient medical records. The purpose of this quantitative, 
comparative study was to identify the difference between the individual patient records 
affected by digital versus nondigital breaches for three types of health care entities in the 
United States, health care providers, health care plans, and health care clearinghouses. 
Allman’s privacy regulation theory, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Privacy Framework, and ecological systems theory comprised the theoretical framework. 
The focus of the research questions was on the difference between digital and nondigital 
breaches for each of the health care entities. The study data consisted of 2,601 digital and 
nondigital breach reports for the three healthcare entities for the years 2010 to 2018 
retrieved from the public database of HIPAA breach and violations maintained by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Significant t tests of the hypotheses for 
each health care entity indicated that more breaches occurred digitally than nondigitally, 
and that health plan provider breaches resulted in a greater number of individuals 
impacted per incident than breaches of healthcare providers or healthcare clearinghouses. 
The implication for positive social change is that the study findings may help health care 
entities make better decisions about how to allocate scarce information security resources 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Cyberattackers widely target financial and health care entities because they are 
critical infrastructures. In 2019, there were 94 reported information breaches in the U.S. 
healthcare system from January to March, affecting a total of 3,486,735 individuals (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).The general problem is that providing 
adequate information security within the health care sector is both challenging and costly. 
For health care entities, providing information security increases the cost of health care 
for the U.S. public (Toé, 2013). Toé (2013) examined the explicit costs of sensitive 
information security breaches and found that breaches involving financial information, 
medical protected records, social security numbers, names, and addresses have an impact 
on the explicit costs associated with health care. The U.S. government has regulated the 
information security protocols for the health care organizations under the umbrella of 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations since the 
enactment of HIPAA in 1996 to protect patient health information in this electronic era 
(Pekala, 2017).  
The objective of this research study was to estimate the difference between digital 
and nondigital breaches of individual patient records for each of the three types of health 
care entities in the United States. The identification of the type of breach that occurs the 
most and the most targeted entity determined where health care organizations should 
focus their efforts and resources to decrease the number of breaches of individual patient 
records. Current literature provides analyses of which type of breach costs the health care 
industry the mostas well as information on breaches by entity type and the numbers of 
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breached individual patient records (U.S Department of Health and Human Services, 
n.d.). The goal of this study was to examine these sets of data to determine any potential 
differences between digital and nondigital breaches.  
This chapter includes the following key sections: (a) background of the study, (b) 
problem statement, (c) purpose of the study, (d) research questions and hypotheses, (e) 
theoretical foundation, (f) nature of the study, (g) definitions, (h) assumptions, (i) scope 
and delimitations, (j), limitations, and (k) significance of the study. A summary of the key 
points of the study and an overview of the succeeding chapters conclude the chapter.  
Background of the Study 
Phishing refers to the practice of obtaining computer credentials from authorized 
users through manipulation and deceit (Wright et al., 2016). In this instance of phishing, 
the hospital’s information technology (IT) department claiming the user needs to update 
their computer credentials through fraudulent emails sent to users pretending to be 
legitimate senders. While most computer users have heard of and are watchful for 
potential phishing schemes, the ever-evolving technology of scams means that phishing 
schemes are getting more elaborate and convincing, tricking users into giving away 
sensitive information that can grant a hacker access to the hospital’s private records 
(Wright et al., 2016). While the health care organizations must report breaches of 
protected health care information, the actual number of breaches is unknown because it is 
challenging to catch the vast majority of attacks (Wright et al., 2016). Between 2014 and 
2016, there were 10 reported breaches of health care information associated with 
phishing schemes (Wright et al., 2016). However, security consultants estimate that 
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hospitals routinely undergo several phishing attacks each week. The success rate of these 
attacks is difficult to estimate because users who fall for the scheme are unlikely to 
realize it (Martin et al., 2017).  
Hackers steal and sell personal identifying information (e.g., social security 
numbers, Medicare numbers, and dates of birth) from healthcare organizations in online 
black markets or to criminal networks that use the information to commit financial fraud 
(Wright et al., 2016). The criminal entities highly prize the information stolen from health 
care organizations due to the completeness of the information. The information often 
sells for many times the cost of a stolen credit card number (Wright et al., 2016). While 
some estimates place the cost of an identity stolen from a health care organization at $10 
per identity, other estimates are as high as several hundred dollars an identity (Wright et 
al., 2016). The sheer number of identities housed in hospital databases makes health care 
organizations an attractive target for hackers. 
Hackers looking to illegally access health care databases may have schemes other 
than identifying possibilities for theft in mind. Once they gain access to the database, 
hackers may use falsified or stolen credentials to change direct payroll deposits to their 
bank accounts, thereby stealing employee wages (Martin et al., 2017). Similarly, 
attackers could use the credentials to forge prescriptions or steal clinical data for 
blackmail. Once hackers gain access to a database, it can be challenging to remove them. 
In 2016, Hollywood Presbyterian Hospital experienced extended downtimes due to 
malware installed by hackers (Wright et al., 2016). Eventually, the hospital paid the 
attackers a ransom of $17,000 to remove the malware from their hospital system (Wright 
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et al., 2016). The ransom received was unlikely to be the hacker’s biggest prize because 
they had extended access to the hospital’s database, including payroll information and 
personally identifiable information for employees and patients.  
The HIPAA established safeguards to protect sensitive information from 
cybercriminals, including requiring unique user identification numbers, emergency access 
procedures, automatic logoff functions, encryption, and decryption (Kruse et al., 2017). 
However, despite these protections, there are still ways to illegally access systems, and 
criminals try to be ahead of the security protocols. Health care organizations face the 
challenge of not only maintaining their systems but continuously improving them to keep 
up with more and more advanced hacking methods. In recent years, health care 
organizations have increased spending to improve hospital integration; however, they 
have not spent the same amount of resources improving their data security integration 
(Kruse et al., 2017). According to Kruse et al. (2017), there may be several reasons for 
this. Updating software can be a time-intensive process, so organizations may struggle to 
find the downtime necessary to make updates. Improved security may also come with 
increased roadblocks for users. Two-factor authentication is a method of improving 
security with logging on to the system, but it takes longer for the user, so organizations 
that try to implement it face pushback from busy staff (Kruse et al., 2017). Like network 
integration, security improvements are expensive (Kruse et al., 2017). However, unlike 
network integration, security improvements are not likely to produce a positive effect on 
the user (Martin et al., 2017). Improving integration means users can get the data they 
need faster and easier. The same is not applicable for data security; therefore, the 
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incentive to improve security does not exist as it does for network integration (Martin et 
al., 2017). 
While many researchers have discussed the rising prevalence of cyberattacks on 
health care organizations and trends relating to these attacks (Kruse et al., 2017; Martin et 
al., 2017; Pekala, 2017; Toé, 2013; Wright et al., 2016), there is scarce extant literature 
on the difference in the number of affected individuals between the types of information 
security breaches and types of healthcare entities in the U.S. healthcare system. This 
critical gap means that IT professionals, health care professionals, and health care 
consumers are unaware of their organization or data being at an increased risk for theft or 
hacking. Addressing this gap in the literature would allow organizations to be more aware 
of their risk and encourage them to take the steps necessary to protect the data. 
Problem Statement 
Even with the advent and implementation of stricter laws to prevent cyberattacks, 
the number of breaches increases every year, due primarily to the increasing adoption of 
digital infrastructure and the rise of software solutions to aid in operational tasks within 
the health care sector (Gomillion, 2017). From the end-user to the sensitive core health 
care storage infrastructure, there are several layers, such as firewalls, encryptions, and 
other cybersecurity measures (Shahri et al., 2012). Users remain the weakest link in 
information security because most users lack the awareness of the risk involved (Shahri 
et al., 2012). With such high reliance on the digitalization of patient records, IT is 
evolving to be one of the fastest-growing trends in the U.S. healthcare system (Nimkar, 
2016). Although the majority of breaches occur because of human error (Lineberry, 
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2007), there are other ways to lower information security breaches in the health care 
industry. Digitalizing and securing patient data is expensive (Berwick & Gaines, 2018). 
As cybercriminals utilize the internet more frequently and in more varied ways, the need 
for more sophisticated defense countermeasures becomes increasingly apparent (Langer, 
2017). 
The three health care entities in the United States (i.e., health care providers, 
health plan providers, and health care clearinghouses) hold a large amount of digital 
patient data. There is a gap in the literature regarding the differences between nondigital 
and digital breaches of patient records within health care entities. Researchers have not 
studied the extent of digital and nondigital breaches of patient medical records in the past, 
leading to the specific management problem of health care providers not knowing the 
extent of digital and nondigital breaches of patient medical records. To combat 
cybercrime in health care organizations, identifying the type of breach that occurs the 
most frequently and the most targeted type of entity is necessary to determine the optimal 
information security resource allocation to decrease the number of breaches of individual 
patient records. The objective of this research study was to estimate the difference 
between digital and nondigital breaches of individual patient records and compare 
individual patient record breaches for each of the three types of health care entities in the 
United States. Identifying the type of breach that occurs the most and the most targeted 
entity can be used to determine where healthcare organizations should focus their efforts 
to decrease the number of breaches of individual patient records. Current literature 
provides analyses of which type of breach costs the health care industry the most and 
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information on breaches by entity type and the numbers of breached individual patient 
records (U.S Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.). The goal of this study was 
to examine these sets of data to determine any potential differences.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if there is a significant 
difference between digital and nondigital breaches of individual patient records for each 
of the three types of health care entities in the United States. The examination of digital 
and nondigital breaches amongst the three health care entities is essential to both 
reducing the number of data breaches and ensuring proper allocation of resources to 
achieve that end. The independent variables were the types of information security 
breaches and health care entities, while the dependent variable was the number of 
breached individual patient records. To examine the difference between variables, I used 
statistical analysis of group means to estimate the differences in individual patient records 
affected between digital and nondigital breaches of health data in the three types of health 
care entities. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The theoretical framework guided the formation of the research questions. I 
developed the following research questions to aid in the examination of the impact of 
digital and nondigital security breaches on individual patient records nondigitalfor each 
of the three types of health care entities in the United States. The research questions and 
associated hypotheses were as follows: 
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RQ1: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health care 
providers? 
H01: There is no significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care providers. 
Ha1. There is a significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care providers. 
RQ2: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health 
plan providers? 
H02: There is no significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health plan providers. 
Ha2: There is a significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health plan providers. 
RQ3: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 




H03: There is no significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care clearinghouses. 
Ha3: There is a significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care clearinghouses. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical framework for this quantitative, comparative study consisted of 
two theories: Allman’s privacy regulation theory (and the associated National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Privacy Framework) and the ecological systems 
theory. In the privacy regulation theory, Allman (2018) posited that the goal of privacy 
regulation is to achieve the most favorable level of privacy. Privacy is a nonmonotonic 
function, meaning that there can be too much privacy or too little privacy (Margulis, 
2003). Health care information systems require health care entities to protect patient data 
without decreasing the ease of access for authorized users and risking security breaches. 
Allman’s position is that privacy has two levels: individual and group. HIPAA requires 
the protection of an individual’s data; yet, the protection of private information is a group 
process (CITE). The underlying assumption of the NIST Privacy Framework is that if an 
information system’s security plan also includes privacy protections, the resilience of the 
system will provide the resilience of privacy (Hiller & Russell, 2017). The NIST 
Framework includes the position of privacy as a fundamental part of resilient 
cybersecurity, which should work towards maintaining the privacy of citizens as 
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mandated by HIPAA. The NIST Framework is useful as it can help determine what types 
of data breaches and in which health care entities breaches may occur prior to actual data 
breaches. The findings of this study may prove to be a valuable resource to the 
information security professionals in the health care entities and be used to bring about a 
positive social change by increasing information security protocols and reducing the cost 
of information security. 
In addition to the NIST Privacy Framework, I used the ecological systems theory 
as part of the theoretical framework for this quantitative, comparative study. Although the 
NIST Security Framework gives context regarding how to employ cybersecurity and how 
it relates to addressing cybersecurity threats, it does not adequately explain the 
connection between cybersecurity and the health care system. The ecological systems 
theory can be used to create the context for why cybersecurity criminals commit crimes, 
how these cyber breaches affect targeted individuals, and in what ways the employees 
within the health care systems in the United States can be more diligent in protecting 
information.  
Urie Bronfenbrenner developed an ecological systems theory, or human ecology 
theory, in 1979 to explain better the variety of environmental factors that influence 
human behavior. Bronfenbrenner (1992) believed a great deal of human behavior can be  
attributed to various interactions between individuals and their respective ecological 
systems, which includes socialization between different spheres of influence. 
Additionally, Bronfenbrenner posited that interactions interrelate within the ecological 
system and can be both conscious and unconscious in nature. As such, Bronfenbrenner 
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recognized five main environmental systems that influence the entirety of human 
behavior: the individual, the microsystem, the exosystem, the mesosystem, and the 
macrosystem. Within Bronfenbrenner’s ecological construct, all levels interact, especially 
with levels that are sequential. It is possible to examine and contextualize human 
behaviors by constructing the ecological spheres of influence on human interaction 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1992). 
Nature of the Study 
In this study, I used a quantitative approach to examine group means to determine 
if there was a difference between digital and nondigital breaches of health care 
information stored by U.S. health care entities. Specifically, I determined whether there 
was a significance between the number of individual patient records affected per digital 
breach and per nondigital breach for each of the three different types of health care 
entities. This allowed me to conclude whether there were significant differences between 
digital and nondigital breaches within health care entities based on the number of 
breached patient records for each type of breach. 
Definitions 
BYOD management: A data security process where employees who use a 
particular device frequently at home decide to use the same in their organization as well 
(Technopedia, 2019).  
Data loss prevention systems: A set of tools and processes used to ensure that 




Encryption: The method by which plaintext or any other type of data converted 
from a readable form to an encoded version that can decode only by another entity if they 
have access to a decryption key (SearchSecurity, 2019). 
Endpoint and malware protection: An approach to detecting malicious network 
activity and protecting computer networks, including servers, desktops, and mobile 
devices, from intrusions and malware attacks (SearchSecurity, 2019) 
Health care entities: Organizations, including health care providers like hospitals 
and clinics, health plan providers like insurance agencies, and health care clearinghouses, 
also known as billing agencies (National Practitioner Data Bank, n.d,).  
Information breach: The theft of either physical or virtual data. A confirmed 
incident in which sensitive, confidential, or otherwise protected data are exposed in an 
unauthorized fashion (SearchSecurity, 2019). 
Information security: The processes and methodologies that protect the print, 
electronic, or any other form of confidential, private, and sensitive information or data 
from unauthorized access, use, misuse, disclosure, destruction, modification, or 
disruption (SANS, 2019) 
Intrusion prevention systems: A system that monitors a network for malicious 
activities, such as security threats or policy violations (Technopedia, 2019). 
OSI Layer Firewall 7: Layer 7 of a firewall sorts traffic according to which 
application or application service the traffic is trying to reach and what the specific 
contents of that traffic are. Rather than simply blocking all traffic on a certain port, Layer 
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7 allows some traffic through while blocking traffic that may contain a threat 
(DigitalGuardian, 2019) 
Web proxy: A method for hiding an IP address from the websites an individual 
visits (SANS, 2019). 
Assumptions 
The primary assumption in this study was that the data gathered from the 
respective government agencies would be accurate. I sought assistance from the data 
managers or administrators of the government agencies that keep the data to ensure that I 
determined the correct number of affected individuals for each of the different 
information security breaches across different health care entities.  
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this study included individuals affected by information breaches 
across different U.S. health care entities. The participants, selected through purposeful 
sampling, consisted of a cross-representation of different individuals having different 
educational backgrounds, ages, and social statuses. I located records for the individuals in 
this study in the HIPAA breach database available for use from 2016 to 2018. The 
analysis involved estimation of comparative differences in the number of affected 
individuals by digital versus nondigital information security breaches across different 
healthcare entities by the comparative research design. 
Limitations 
There were two limitations to the study. First, I gathered data for the variables 
from databases of government agencies. Use of such a method might have limited the 
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insights produced from the analysis because the data might not have reflected the general 
population. Second, the use of a nonprobability sampling procedure, such as purposive 
sampling, reduces the possibility of generalizing the results to a larger population. 
Significance of the Study 
Significance to Theory 
This study may enable information security professionals in the health care 
industry to identify the critical areas in healthcare information security that require more 
attention to avoid information breaches. Over the past 2 decades, the cost of health care 
cost in the United States has proliferated. In an annual report, the Health Care Cost 
Institute (2019) reported that healthcare costs rose 3.9% per year on average between 
2013 and 2017. This figure is higher than the rise of the gross domestic product, which 
averaged a 3.1% increase between 2013 and 2017. Within the same period, the use of 
health care services declined by 0.2%, indicating that there has been an inverse 
relationship between the use of health care services and the cost of health care. One of the 
significant contributors to the increase in health care costs is due to the adaption of IT and 
the digitalization of patient data (Langer, 2017). In the overall IT budget, management 
allocates a significant portion towards information security (Langer, 2017).  
Significance to Practice 
The significance of this study to practice is two-fold. The goal was to further 
explore the importance of information security in the U.S. health care system. Though 
information security has been a growing interest for almost a decade now, only a few 
research studies on the topic existed in the health care field. The health care system holds 
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an enormous amount of digital information about patients, doctors, and health care 
providers; therefore, information security is of paramount priority.  
Significance to Social Change 
The goal of this study was to provide a better understanding of how different 
types of information breaches impact the number of individual patient records affected 
per breach. The findings may help to provide health care entities with information to 
incentivize them to invest in information security to safeguard health care processes and 
patients and lessen the opportunity for information breaches. Furthermore, the results of 
this research could provide positive social change by decreasing the cost of information 
security for the health care entity, which, in turn, would lower the cost of health care for 
the patients. 
Summary and Transition 
The specific problem addressed in this study was identifying the most vulnerable 
entity to data breaches and the type of breach that results in the most individuals affected  
to determine where the most resources are necessary to decrease the number of breaches 
and individuals affected. As such, the purpose of this quantitative, comparative study was 
to determine the difference in the number of affected individuals between the types of 
information security breaches for the three types of U.S. healthcare entities. In this study, 
I used a comparative design to analyze data from the HIPAA breach database, which 
contains information on the type of data breach, the number of affected individuals, and 
the type of health care entity.  
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This study consists of four more chapters. Chapter 2 is a review of the pertinent 
literature relating to information security in the health care industry. In the literature 
review, I will provide a summary of the previous findings as well as previous 
researchers’ recommendations for implementation strategies and future research. In 
Chapter 3, I will present an overview of the research methodology for the study. The 
research design, population and sampling, methods of data collection and data analysis, 
ethical considerations, and the validity and reliability of the instruments will be discussed 
in the chapter. In Chapter 4, I will elaborate on the results of the data analysis to answer 
the research questions. Finally, Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the results and my 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative, comparative study was to determine whether 
there was a significant difference in the number of individual patient records affected in a 
digital breach compared to a nondigital breach of individual patient records for each of 
the three types of U.S. healthcare entities. The examination of digital and nondigital 
breaches across the three healthcare entities is important to both reducing the number of 
data breaches and ensuring proper allocation of resources to achieve that end. To examine 
the difference between variables, I used the comparative design to analyze information on 
the type of breach, the number of affected individuals, and the type of health care entity. 
To aid in the accomplishment of the goals of this research project, I completed an 
exhaustive review of the literature within this chapter to more comprehensively 
understand previous research relevant to the topic of interest: security breaches within the 
U.S. health care system. Topics included in this chapter are seminal sources on the 
conceptual and theoretical framework employed in this study, the composition of the U.S. 
healthcare system, how the U.S. healthcare system operates, types of security breaches 
that can affect the U.S. healthcare system, and how all of the aforementioned factors 
interrelate.  
Literature Search Strategy 
I searched for relevant literature by means of an extensive online search of the 
following databases accessed through the Walden University Library: Communication & 
Mass Media Complete, Web of Science, PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, and 
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PsycCRITIQUES, PsycEXTRA, ERIC, Center for Disease Control, ResearchGate, 
SAGE Journals, and Google Scholar. The search of relevant topics was completed with 
established parameters to return results applicable to this research project. The parameters 
set focused on peer-reviewed articles published between 2015 and 2019. Search results 
yielded approximately 320 articles and other appropriate forms of literature; however, I 
did not use all returned results for the purposes of this literature review. Instead, only 
literature that met all inclusion criteria were employed. The adherence to inclusion 
criteria ensured that all literature included in this project were current, defined as within 
the context of this research study, and published within the past 5 years. Any sources of 
literature outside of that time were defined as classic sources for relevant topics needed 
for the appropriate explanation of theory or concept. Additionally, I used gray literature, 
which is reputable non-peer-reviewed information, in this literature review for emphasis 
or clarity but did not use gray literature as conclusive sources of information or to dictate 
topics of interest in this chapter. 
Key search terms used included: NIST privacy framework, ecological systems 
theory, United States healthcare, healthcare, security and healthcare, healthcare security 
breach, consequences of healthcare breaches, and American healthcare, all in the title. 
Additionally, I made online searches using the terms of implications of security breach, 
cybercrime + American healthcare, and patient information and healthcare to ensure the 
comprehensive nature of literature search.  
After I provide an exhaustive review of relevant topics, this chapter ends with a 




 The conceptual and theoretical framework of a research project is important 
because it often aids in creating the context in which the establishment and results of 
research questions are applied in practice. Often, it is common to consider more than one 
theory within the framework of research to ensure the research topic is more 
comprehensively explained (CITE). The theoretical framework for this research study 
comprise of two theories: the NIST Privacy Framework and ecological system theory. 
The NIST Privacy Framework 
 The NIST developed a comprehensive cybersecurity framework for a variety of 
private sector organizations in which these entities can better protect the information, 
especially sensitive or confidential data (Shen, 2014). The original version of this privacy 
framework, developed in 2014, is known as Version 1.0 (Shen, 2014). Version 1.0 was 
one of the first cybersecurity frameworks that could allow organizations within the 
private sector to be proactive in anticipating security risk (Shen, 2014). Risk management 
is often defined by cybersecurity experts as the continuous array of the process that 
identifies, assesses, and understands cybersecurity risks (Esser, 2018). Further 
cybersecurity and risk management include the framework necessary to reduce the 
impact of possible cybersecurity breaches and the overall prevalence of risk (Esser, 
2018). Cybersecurity and risk management become increasingly important in the modern 
economy and a variety of other services because cybersecurity breaches can cause great 
financial loss, damage to an organization’s reputation, or cause violations of privacy for 
both employees and shareholders (Esser, 2018)  
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An updated version of the NIST Privacy Framework was released in 2017, known 
as Version 1.1, and added a variety of upgrades to Version 1.0 that allows organizations 
in the private sector to include guidance on how to perform self-assessments on possible 
risks regarding security and self-assessments of the risk factors on supply chains (Shen, 
2014). The latter feature is especially important because supply chain security risks can 
also compromise sensitive data on private organizations that interact with one another 
(Shackelford et al., 2015). Version 1.1 also increased information on mitigating risk 
management and how to more appropriately interact with supply chain stakeholders 
(Shackelford et al., 2015). As such, Version 1.1 of the NIST Privacy Framework provides 
a comprehensive security framework for many of the organizations of the private sector 
(Shackelford et al., 2015). The NIST Privacy Framework is an integration of three 
separate but interrelated facets: the Core, the Profiles, and the Implementation of Tiers 
(Shen, 2014).  
The Core  
The Core refers to an exhaustive body of privacy protection activity that  
permits the prioritization of possible security risks and activities that may jeopardize the 
privacy of data collected by organizations (Shen, 2014). When utilized appropriately, the 
Core allows for various ways of individual risks to be assessed and addressed to protect 
the organization from other related individual security or privacy risks (Shackelford et al., 
2015). The Core facet of the NIST Privacy Framework comprises five simultaneously 
addressed functions: identify, protect, control, inform, and respond (Shen, 2014).  
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The first function of the Core of the NIST Privacy Framework is the ability to 
identify ways that organizations may become at risk for security or privacy breaches 
(Miron & Muita, 2014). This identification function includes a wide array of different 
forms of data collected by organizations for everyday operations as well as information 
important to development, research, or consumer trends (Miron & Muita, 2014). The first 
form of data that needs to be identified and assessed includes all the assets of the 
organization, which is known as asset management (AM; Miron & Muita, 2014). AM 
includes all data collected from the actual systems, devices, or technology present within 
an organization that allows for businesses to achieve functionality (Shen, 2014). When 
AM occurs, each of the aforementioned types of data are identified and then subsequently 
ranked by both importance to the company and how likely the data are to be 
compromised (Miron & Muita, 2014).  
The next type of data examined by the NIST Privacy Framework is the data 
related to the respective business environment (BE; Shen, 2014). The BE includes all 
data concerning the purpose, functionality, and associated objectives of an organization 
(Shen, 2014). Further, the BE includes the integration of data from stakeholders and their 
associated activities within an organization. BE is often assessed by the NIST Privacy 
Framework to ensure the cybersecurity and recommended risk management protocols are 
in alignment with the organization (Esser, 2018).  
Another form of data identified and prioritized within the Core of NIST Privacy 
Framework is referred to as governance (Shen, 2014). Governance includes the 
implementation of data related to the policies and operations procedures within the 
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organization (Shen, 2014). This includes the data included in regulatory compliance on 
legal, environmental, and operational policies (Esser, 2018). In this way, the NIST 
Privacy Framework can assess risk related to these types of data and prioritize them 
respective to organizational importance (Esser, 2018).  
Risk assessment (RA) is also a part of the Core component of the NIST Privacy 
Framework (Esser, 2018). RA includes any form of cybersecurity risk than can be 
associated with the mission or overall functionality of an organization (Esser, 2018). 
Additionally, the execution of RA is to ensure that any possible cybersecurity breach or 
privacy violation does not extensively damage the reputation or public image of a 
company (Esser, 2018). As security breaches can be catastrophic to the organization or 
associated personnel, RA is a vital component of proactive cybersecurity risk assessment 
(Shen, 2014).  
The final assessment completed by the Core component of the NIST Privacy 
Framework is called risk management strategy (RMS; Esser, 2018). RMS includes the 
identification of an organization’s priorities regarding both functionality and potential 
cybersecurity risk (Esser, 2018). Additionally, RMS includes the identification of an 
organization’s limitations or constraints to obtaining functionality and mitigating 
cybersecurity and privacy breaches for both the organization and associated stakeholders 
(Scofield, 2016). To accomplish and implement effective RMSs, tolerance levels for an 
organization’s level of perceived risk are ascertained and then used to as part of the RMS 
(Scofield, 2016). Finally, within the RMS, assumptions about perceived security risks are 
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established relative to the type of organization and integrated into the Core facet of the 
NIST Privacy Framework (Scofield, 2016). 
The second function of the NIST Privacy Framework is to protect vital parts of an 
organization’s infrastructure (Shen, 2014). In order to protect an organization, there is a 
simultaneous implementation of a variety of interrelated steps that comprehensively 
protect the data, assets, and personnel of the organization (Esser, 2018). First, the NIST 
Privacy Framework establishes a variety of control measures that restrict access to 
sensitive data, known as access control (Esser, 2018). The establishment of access control 
through the physical restriction of inappropriate personnel to places in which sensitive 
material is housed or through the implementation of restriction protocols ensure that 
unauthorized personnel does not have access to sensitive data stored within the databases 
of the organization (Shen, 2014). Online restriction protocols can prohibit access to 
sensitive data by not only restricting personnel to the databases but also restricting access 
to sensitive processes and devices utilized to gather, store, or analyze data (Scofield, 
2016).  
Another facet is the categorization of awareness and training to protect function 
(Esser, 2018). Within this context, awareness and training refers to the training of 
personnel associated with the organization or the organization’s stakeholders regarding 
what types of behaviors can lead to an increased risk of cybersecurity risk (Shen, 2014). 
Additionally, this type of training can facilitate awareness of what types of data are 
targeted in cybersecurity breaches or security risks (Scofield, 2016). In this way, 
organizations and stakeholders can train personnel to perform duties regarding proper 
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cybersecurity and integrate more comprehensive security-based initiatives within formal 
training sessions (Scofield, 2016).     
Another aspect of the protective function of the NIST Security Framework 
includes the development and installation of data security measures within all portions of 
the company’s operational protocols (Shen, 2014). This type of data protection includes a 
variety of measures that can encrypt or encode data within organizational databases 
(Shen, 2014). When data are encrypted or encoded, the data relevant to the company can 
be better protected. Furthermore, in this way, the integrity and availability of sensitive 
information are largely inaccessible, even if a cyberdata breach occurs (Esser, 2018). 
Information protection processes and procedures (PRIP) is another protective 
measure within the NIST Security Framework (Esser, 2018). PRIP refers to the 
development and implementation of various security policies needed by an organization 
(Esser, 2018). Security-based polices can include workplace rules on the purpose of 
security measures, the scope of security risks, and the commitment of the organization to 
ensure security measures are followed (Shen, 2014). Moreover, PRIP can include 
workplace procedures regarding the responsibilities of each employee to ensure 
cybersecurity is maintained and consequences for failure to adhere to policy (Scofield, 
2016). PRIP is a vital component of the protection factor of NIST privacy Framework to 
ensure that all personnel within an organization are in agreement on security measures 
and that all procedures are cohesive and implemented the same way by all employees and 
stakeholders (Scofield, 2016).     
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Maintenance (MA) of all security features instituted within a workplace culture is 
imperative for all security measures to operate appropriately (Shen, 2014). As such, MA 
is the next component of the protection factor of the NIST privacy Framework (Shen, 
2014). MA within this framework refers to the repairs needed for control systems or 
software utilized to encrypt, encode, house, or analyze the data within an organization 
(Esser, 2018). Often this type of MA requires professional cybersecurity professionals 
that employ within or externally to the organization (Esser, 2018). Often companies that 
handle large amounts of sensitive data employ full-time cybersecurity to staff to ensure 
protective measures are always working properly and avoid cybersecurity breaches 
(Esser, 2018).  
The last facet of the protection factor within the NIST privacy Framework is the 
implementation of protective technology (PT) (Esser, 2018). PT includes a variety of 
security measures that has the main objective of properly monitoring security features 
and ensure that developed security features are performing accurately (Shen, 2014). 
Additionally, PT can include cybersystems needed to respond to repair security measures 
should they fail, quickly before a cyber breach occurs (Shen, 2014).  
The third factor of the NIST privacy Framework is detection (Esser, 2018). 
Within this context, detection refers to the examination and identification of different 
possible security threats and cybersecurity breaches (Esser, 2018). Detection for 
cybersecurity threats and security breaches focuses on searching for Anomalies and 
Events (AE). Often, employees responsible for cybersecurity will scan virtual activity for 
any events that appear abnormal or out of context (Walser, 2018). Abnormal events are 
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largely subjective and unique to the respective organization; however, they are defined by 
the online presence by unauthorized or unrecognized participants or within the discovery 
of pervasive online activity (Walser, 2018). The pervasive online activity includes 
unusual behavior that is largely unnecessary when proper access is established (Walser, 
2018). Pervasive online activity may include multiple log-in attempts to restricted data, 
trying to gain access to data outside normal access methods, or trying to access sensitive 
data anonymously (Walser, 2018). If the case of identification of abnormal or pervasive 
online activity, then cybersecurity professionals can isolate the incident and hopefully 
avoid cybersecurity breaches (Esser, 2018). 
The next detection method utilized by the NIST Security Framework is 
continuous monitoring (Shen, 2014). As the aforementioned AE locate with the training 
and employment of cybersecurity experts, an organization must employ continuous 
monitoring to ensure that if cybersecurity becomes jeopardized, the identification occurs 
quickly and in real-time (Walser, 2018). CM included the examination of all sensitive 
data within established intervals to ensure that all data can be monitored effectively 
(Shen, 2014). Additionally, CM implementation occurred to also monitor the efficacy of 
established security measures and the effectiveness of responses to cybersecurity 
breaches (Walser, 2018).      
The last facet of detection methods utilized within the NIST Security Framework 
is known as detection processes (Esser, 2018). DP includes the identification of various 
processes or protocols that are maintained by the organization or associated stakeholders 
(Esser, 2018). DP also includes the establishment of novel modes of detection for 
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cybersecurity breaches and the development of new ways to ensure that AE’s can be 
addressed adequately and in a timely manner (Shen, 2014). 
The next facet of the Core function of the NIST privacy Framework is known as 
respond (Shen, 2014). This facet involves the development and execution of protocols 
needed when a cybersecurity breach is detected (Esser, 2018). The first part of the 
respond is response planning (Esser, 2018). Response planning within this context refers 
to the need for any processes or initiatives in case of a cybersecurity breach (Shen, 2014). 
Within RP, the organization and associated stakeholders create a comprehensive response 
protocol if a cybersecurity breach should occur to ensure that there can be timely 
response and little ambiguity (Walser, 2018).  
To ensure that an RP is comprehensive and situationally appropriate, 
organizations and their stakeholders establish a variety of communications (Esser, 2018). 
The creation of communications ensures that verbiage and syntax describing 
cybersecurity risks are universally understood (Walser, 2018). In this way, when a cyber 
breach occurs, response times can be reduced, and the confusion largely mitigated (Esser, 
2018). Further, communications are often shared with external law enforcement agencies 
to guarantee that if law enforcement services are needed, they understand the gravity of 
the situation and how best to mitigate cyber breaches (Shen, 2014). 
After COs for a company are established and distributed to appropriate personnel, 
and analysis (AN) is often conducted by an organization to ensure that response to 
cybersecurity breaches were adequate (Esser, 2018). Often the AN is conducted by an 
outside cybersecurity firm that specializes in testing response protocols (Keller, 2017). In 
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this way, the AN can be more comprehensive and unbiased than the completion by 
cybersecurity specialists associated with the organization or stakeholders (Keller, 2017). 
After the AN is complete, then cybersecurity experts can make recommendations 
on how to best address issues that arise during AN (Keller, 2017). Often these issues 
include inadequacy within the response itself or shortcomings in identifying the initial 
cybersecurity breach (Esser, 2018). When the identification issues occur, then mitigation 
(MI) can occur (Keller, 2017). MI often include the activities or policies needed to 
contain the consequences of a cybersecurity breach or keep the cybersecurity breach from 
spreading into other data while occurring (Shen, 2014). Finally, MI can include the 
policies or activities needed to erase traces of the incident and repair the breach within 
the future (Keller, 2017). Subsequently, Improvements made to the cybersecurity 
framework of an organization (Keller, 2017). Improvements can include novel ways to 
make the establishment, execution, and analyses of cybersecurity protocols for a given 
organization or associated stakeholders (Esser, 2018).  
The last part of the Core Function is known as Recover (Esser, 2018). Recover 
includes the development and execution of any protocols or activities needed to mitigate 
the scope and effects of cybersecurity attacks (Keller, 2017). Within this type of recovery 
includes the restoration of all functionality of all data-related programs within the 
organization or associated stakeholders (Esser, 2018). Within the recovery step, it is 
imperative that the restoration of functionality is expedient and comprehensive. 
Moreover, the documentation of all necessary steps, and if these issues are novel, they 
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often contribute to the communications and plans associated with security within the 
organization (Esser, 2018)  
The aforementioned list of components represents the components that create the 
Core function of the NIST privacy Framework. It is within the Core that the needs of an 
organization are identified and examined (Shen, 2014). 
Further, the Core allows the organization and associated stakeholders to establish 
priorities regarding cybersecurity needs and initiatives (Shen, 2014). Finally, the core 
establishes a set language for individuals that are employed within cybersecurity and law 
enforcement to ensure the reduction of confusion and ambiguity if a cyber breach should 
occur (Esser, 2018). Once the Core needs are established and prioritized, information 
ascertained from the Core in order to make a profile of the organization (Keller, 2017).  
The Profiles. Profiles created by the information contained within the Core of the 
organization (Keller, 2017). The utilization of profiles occurs in two main ways regarding 
cybersecurity (Esser, 2018). First, the use of the profile of an organization as the 
framework of a company’s current cybersecurity protocols (Esser, 2018). This includes 
all initiatives, training, and safety measures that are implemented within an organization 
and by associated stakeholders (Esser, 2018). Further, the profile of a company also 
includes the framework needed to meet cybersecurity needs in the future, including the 
development of new cybersecurity protection (Shen, 2014).  
The other function of the profile of an organization is to make connections 
between facets, which aids in the comprehensive nature of the assessment of risk and the 
distribution of resources needed to combat cyber breaches (Esser, 2018). Organizations 
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can have many profiles depending on the type of data the company obtains and utilizes 
within an operation (Shen, 2014). Additionally, profiles on an organization may affect the 
way in which an organization interacts within the third factor of the NIST Security 
Framework, the Implementation of Tiers (Esser, 2018).  
Implementation of Tiers 
The Implementation of Tiers is the last major portion of the NIST privacy 
Framework (Shen, 2014). Tiers refer to the level or scope that the implementation of the 
cybersecurity measures within an organization (Shen, 2014). The greater the tier, the 
more sophisticated or comprehensive the cybersecurity measure (Esser, 2018). Often the 
designation of Tiers is given to various measures in order to convey importance between 
various levels of cybersecurity experts and operational management (Esser, 2018). 
Within the NIST privacy Framework, there are four tiers to denote differences in 
sophistication and integration (Shen, 2014). The lowest tier within this system is Tier I 
(Shen, 2014). Tier I refer to cybersecurity measures that are largely transient in nature 
and only partially integrated within the cybersecurity framework (Esser, 2018). Often, 
Tier I measures are largely unofficial within the organizational operation and are often 
informal and receive little or no cybersecurity coordination (Esser, 2018).  
Tier II is the next inclusive level. Within Tier II, there exists some level of 
awareness of potential cybersecurity threats (Esser, 2018). As such, there is a small 
amount of coordination and resources shared between cybersecurity employees and 
management to ensure implementation, and however, if the implementation fails, 
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cybersecurity risk is low (Keller, 2017). Moreover, if the access of data is by the 
cybersecurity breach, the type of data is often not sensitive in nature (Keller, 2017).  
Tier III refers to cybersecurity protection measures that are primarily 
implemented in the company and with associated stakeholders (Esser, 2018). Often, Tier 
III security measures are formal parts of security procedure and, as such, are repeated 
regularly (Esser, 2018). Tier III security measures are revised and updated as needed, and 
a good amount of resources spent on Tier III security (Keller, 2017). If the breach 
occurred to the data protected by Tier III protocols, sensitive data becomes exposed, and 
often breaches within this tier can be problematic across multiple types of data (Esser, 
2018).  
The last tier, Tier IV, is the most sophisticated security measures (Esser, 2018). 
Security measures within Tier IV have large amounts of resources devoted to the 
implementation and appropriate integration with the system in lower tiers (Shen, 2014). 
Security measures within Tier IV are often largely cohesive within other security 
protocols and are common practice within the organization and with stakeholders (Shen, 
2014). Tier IV cybersecurity often occur in response to prior breaches and, as such, are 
largely unique to respective organizations (Esser, 2018). Massive consequences arise if 
the breach occurred to the data protected by Tier IV cybersecurity of the organization 
(Esser, 2018). 
Within the NIST privacy Framework, practices and identification of security 
issues are largely based on effective predictive indicators and experience (Esser, 2018). 
Often the development of security measures ascertained through the NIST privacy 
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Framework is implemented throughout organizations and within the security measures of 
associated stakeholders (Shen, 2014). Currently, the identification of Core security issues, 
the development of Profiles, and the implementation of the Tiers are largely voluntary 
(Shen, 2014). However, the NIST privacy Framework is one of the most comprehensive 
cybersecurity initiatives in existence (Esser, 2018). As such, the NIST privacy 
Framework is an adequate framework in which to study the topic of this study, security 
breaches in the healthcare system.  
Ecological Systems Theory 
 In addition to the NIST privacy Framework, the exploration of Ecological 
Systems Theory (EST) helps to establish the systems theory. Although the NIST privacy 
Framework gives context to how cybersecurity is employed and how it relates to 
addressing cybersecurity threats, the NIST privacy Framework does not adequately 
explain the connection between cybersecurity and the healthcare system. Additionally, 
the utilization of the EST can give context to why cybersecurity crimes occur and why 
and in which ways the healthcare system within the United States can be more diligent in 
protecting information.  
Ecological systems theory, or human ecology theory, was established by Urie 
Bronfenbrenner in 1979 to explain better the variety of environmental factors that 
influence human behavior. Bronfenbrenner (1992) believed that much of human behavior 
could attribute to various interactions between an individual and their ecological system, 
which includes socialization between different spheres of influence. Additionally, 
Bronfenbrenner posited that interactions within the ecological system are often 
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interrelated and can be both conscious and unconscious. As such, Bronfenbrenner 
recognized five central environmental systems that influence the entirety of human 
behavior: the individual, the microsystem, the exosystem, the mesosystem, and the 
macrosystem. Within Bronfenbrenner’s ecological construct, all levels interact, especially 
with levels that are positioned prior and subsequently (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). With the 
construction of the ecological spheres of influence on human interaction, human 
behaviors can be examined and contextualized (Bronfenbrenner, 1992).  
Bronfenbrenner (1992) identified the smallest sphere of influence as the 
individual. It is within this level, and intrinsic interactions create the majority of influence 
upon an individual (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). Interactions within the individual level 
include factors such as sex, age, quality of health, ethnicity, and socioeconomic station. 
Interactions between the aforementioned factors can explain the way in which a person 
interprets and reacts within their respective environment (Hertler et al., 2018). 
Additionally, the many factors within the individual level of behavioral influence may be 
the primary motivators for many behaviors as these factors create perspective (Hertler et 
al., 2018). An individual’s perspective concerning the environment in which they often 
live dictates which actions and beliefs consider as normative (Hertler et al., 2018). Within 
the context of this project, Bronfenbrenner’s individual level becomes vital for 
understanding why some people commit cybercrime, as behaviors that are considered 
risky to much of the American population, may be perceived as normative to some 
individuals. Further, the individual level can explain why some individuals feel 
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compelled to protect the personal information of others’ from cybercrime and properly 
protect sensitive data relevant to organizations from cyber breaches.  
The next most proximal level to the explanation of human behavior within the 
EST is the microsystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). Factors that influence human interaction 
within the microsystem includes any thoughts, emotions, or actions that are possessed by 
people that are close to the individual (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). The microsystem includes 
interaction with peers, family, schools, or religious affiliations and community members 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1992). The influence of the microsystem is conscious primarily to the 
individual within the interactions (Hertler et al., 2018). The beliefs and actions of others 
in the microsystem can directly impact the behaviors, actions, and disposition of the 
individual and often connect to deep-rooted behaviors or beliefs within an individual’s 
value system. 
Additionally, the individual can influence the microsystem, as the microsystem 
comprises of individuals that are important to the individual. In this way, the 
microsystem is reciprocal in nature (Hertler et al., 2018). In the microsystem, much of the 
influence on an individual’s behavior that does not comprise of intrinsic factors are 
explained as members of the microsystem often project their own beliefs about normative 
and non-normative behavior within this sphere of influence (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). This 
level helps to understand how the collaborative behaviors of individuals within the 
healthcare system interact with one another and interact with patients to address the 
patients’ needs.  
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The level subsequent to the microsystem refers to as the mesosystem 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1992). It is within the mesosystem where various microsystems can 
interact. This collaboration between microsystems can often influence the behavior of the 
individual (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). The mesosystem is also where the influence of 
consciousness ends, and subconscious influence begins (Hertler et al., 2018). According 
to Bronfenbrenner (1992), although an individual is aware of the interactions between 
themselves and the mesosystem, individuals are largely unaware of how the mesosystem 
work together with various microsystems to influence behavior. The level of the 
mesosystem is another level that becomes influential to this project as the mesosystem is 
largely representative of interactions between the patients and healthcare systems, which 
may lead to unintended consequences. For example, a patient can interact with a 
healthcare provider but may not be aware of how their information storage procedure by 
the overall healthcare system or how that may put them at risk of a cyber breach was to 
occur.   
The exosystem is the next most inclusive layer within Bronfenbrenner’s EST. In 
the exosystem, it influenze the individual, and their respective behaviors; however, the 
individual plays no direct role within this sphere of influence (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). 
The exosystem may include interactions between entities like healthcare providers and 
insurance companies or healthcare providers and legislative bodies (Bronfenbrenner, 
1992). In this way, the resultant actions of the interactions affect the individual and future 
interactions; however, the individual is absent from the collaboration (Bronfenbrenner, 
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1992). Moreover, although the interactions can directly influence the individual, much of 
the influence of the exosystem is an unconscious influence (Hertler et al., 2018). 
The exosystem gives way to the macrosystem, the next level in Bronfenbrenner’s 
ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). Within the macrosystem occurs all 
influences on behaviors that facilitate governance within the ecosystem of an individual. 
The macrosystem includes legislation, religious doctrine, and ethnic customs that shape 
and influence the behavior of an individual (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). Bronfenbrenner  
believes much of the influence of the macrosystem to unconscious influence as these 
factors are omnipresent and have been acting upon an individual since childhood. In this 
way, the mesosystem also influences the smaller levels of not only the individual but also 
of all the smaller levels of every individual that inhabit similar locales (Hertler et al., 
2018).   
The last and most inclusive level of influence within the ecological systems 
theory is the chronosystem. The chronosystem includes the time in which an individual 
lives. The chronosystem, according to Bronfenbrenner (1992), gives context to all the 
aforementioned levels of influence on human behavior (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). In 
addition to time, the chronosystem also encompasses all types of transition events that are 
important for development and may influence behavior (Bronfenbrenner, 1992) For 
example, the death of a loved one or the onset of sickness can influence the behavior of 
an individual (Hertler et al., 2018).  
The ecological systems theory was included as part of the theoretical framework 
of this project as this theory can more comprehensively explain the influence on human 
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behavior. The theory of ecological systems use to infer that human behavior is not part of 
an isolated event but a part of an interrelated system of influence (Bronfenbrenner, 1992). 
As such, the ecological systems theory utilize to not only explain why people commit 
cybercrimes but also many of the behaviors of the healthcare system of the United States. 
The ecological systems theory can aid in understanding the behaviors of individuals 
associated with the healthcare system, including how they protect patient information, 
why they protect patient information, and how these protective behaviors influence 
cybercrime.  
Review of the Literature 
 In addition to the conceptual and theoretical framework of the project, a 
comprehensive review of literature relevant to research topics occur. As the topic of this 
research project is increased healthcare costs associated with cyber breaches within the 
United States, topics covered within this section include an overview of the U.S. 
healthcare system, an overview of how cyber breaches occur, and how costs of healthcare 
increase in relation to prevention measures against cybercrime.  
Healthcare Systems Within the United States 
Healthcare Composition 
Within the United States, much of the healthcare system privatization, meaning 
that they majority stake by the private entities (Barr, 2016). Conversely, there exist 
medical facilities that are owned and operated by varying facets of the government (Barr, 
2016). Although medical practices are similar regarding medical practice in both private 
and governmental healthcare facilities, often the private healthcare providers are more 
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convenient to the patient (Singh, 2015). In most privately owned healthcare facilities, a 
patient can make an appointment, and accommodations are far less crowded in 
comparison to public health care entities (Barr, 2016). Access to the facilities varies 
primarily by the type of health insurance possessed by the patient (Singh, 2015). Private 
insurance often offers a broader array of healthcare options than does governmental 
insurance programs, such as Medicaid or Medicare (Barr, 2016).  
In addition to private or governmentally run or private healthcare facilities, there 
exist healthcare options known as free clinics (Singh, 2015). Often free clinics are 
considered as part of social networks for community residents that do not possess the 
resources to obtain insurance in other ways, like employment or through government 
programs (Barr, 2016). Free clinics often are subsidized by private or corporate donations 
to continue operations (VanderWielen & Ozcan, 2015). Although free clinics are often 
widely used within communities, free clinics often only offer a limited number of 
healthcare services (VanderWielen & Ozcan, 2015). Most free clinics are able to provide 
services to patients based on short-term or situational needs such as acute sickness, some 
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and some limited dental or vision care 
(VanderWielen & Ozcan, 2015). 
Conversely, free clinics are often not equipped to offer long-term care or care for 
chronic diseases such as cancer (VanderWielen & Ozcan, 2015). To determine which 
services the free clinic offers, often, the needs of the community dictate the type of 
services offered (VanderWielen & Ozcan, 2015). For example, if the community 
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experiences a high incidence of STD free clinics within that area often offer more 
comprehensive services for STD treatment and prevention.  
As healthcare within the United States comprise of interrelated networks of 
privately owned and publicly operated facilities, often the costs and access to different 
forms of healthcare are dictated by resources available to those in need of services 
(Papanicolas et al., 2018). Often the costs associated with services can vary greatly 
between community, service type, and severity of the condition (Papanicolas et al., 
2018). As such, understanding healthcare costs is important for the overall 
comprehension of the healthcare system within the United States. 
Healthcare Costs 
The healthcare system within the United States consists of many interrelated private and 
public entities that offer an array of services and goods that influence the health of the 
American people (Dietz et al., 2016). According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), within the United States, approximately 65% of healthcare is subsidized by the 
government, including Medicare and Medicaid systems (WHO, 2016). Medicare is a 
governmental program that often grants health insurance coverage to Americans older 
than 65 years of age or younger persons with disabilities (WHO, 2016). Each year an 
estimated 55 million Americans utilize Medicare to meet healthcare costs. Similarly, 
Medicaid is a governmentally funded program that grants healthcare subsidies to 
Americans living in poverty, which as of 2017 was approximately 70 million Americans 
(WHO, 2016) The remaining costs of healthcare is assumed by U.S. persons as often 
respective healthcare is a result of employment benefits (Papanicolas et al., 2018).  
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 Although the U.S. government agencies largely subsidize the price of healthcare, 
the cost of healthcare within the United States can become quite costly (Papanicolas et 
al., 2018). Currently, within the United States, it is estimated that the cost of healthcare is 
almost 4,000,000,000,000 dollars annually, an almost 6500% increase than 50 years ago 
(WHO, 2016). These costs estimates indicate that healthcare costs within the United 
States comprise approximately 20% of the overall gross domestic product (WHO, 2016). 
This increase in health care costs results in an estimated cost of healthcare of 
$10,000 per year per adult, which includes a variety of both proactive healthcare 
measures and treatments for various illnesses and injuries (Papanicolas et al., 2018). As 
such, the average American adult will contribute approximately 15% of all earnings to 
healthcare costs (Papanicolas et al., 2018). The contribution ratio of earnings to the 
healthcare cost increases continuously; however, if health ailments are severe or chronic 
in nature (Papanicolas et al., 2018).  
There are two causal factors that contribute to the inexorable rise in healthcare 
costs within U.S., lifestyle habits, and operational costs. (Dietz et al., 2016). The first 
causal factor lifestyle habits refer to the way in which the average American lives today 
(Dietz et al. , 2016). When compared to U.S. adults 50 years ago, the rates of disease 
such as diabetes, obesity, and heart disease are much more prevalent, as are other 
diseases attributed to unhealthy habits (Dietz et al., 2016). This is due mostly to change in 
lifestyle, as many adults are now more sedentary and eat less healthy diets overall (Kim 
& Basu, 2016). As these diseases and many others are largely preventable with proper 
diet and exercise, adhering to proactive measures can greatly reduce the prevalence of 
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these diseases; however, once they are acquired, healthcare costs can be great to mitigate 
symptoms (Kim & Basu, 2016).  
According to research, healthy American adults only contribute to about 5% of 
overall healthcare costs within the United States (Dietz et al., 2016). This indicates that 
with proper healthy lifestyle habits reduce the overall the price of healthcare. Moreover, 
50% of Americans that identify as unhealthy are responsible for the other 95% of 
healthcare costs annually (Dietz et al., 2016). As the population of the United States 
becomes less healthy, the cost of healthcare increases dramatically (Kim & Basu, 2016).  
The second reason the costs of healthcare costs have risen drastically within the 
past few decades is operational costs (Yeganeh, 2019). As the U.S. healthcare system 
relies heavily on insurance costs and government initiatives such as Medicare and 
Medicaid, expansion of services to accommodate changing healthcare needs largely 
increased the cost of healthcare (Yeganeh, 2019). Additionally, research associated with 
the development of novel treatments and more efficient technology also raises the prices 
of healthcare (Yeganeh, 2019). Finally, within the past few decades, the need to digitize 
all data collected within the healthcare systems has been expensive and have increased 
the cost of healthcare (Yeganeh, 2019)  
The need to digitize data facilitated by the increased need and ability to share 
patient files more quickly between healthcare providers and share billing information 
with insurance companies to decrease payment times (Bhavnani et al., 2016). To 
digitized data, many healthcare entities needed to code and upload a variety of data; 
including patient files, billing information, administrative files, employee information 
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and procedural protocols (Bhavnani et al., 2016) This feat required the hiring of a large 
amount of staff and cybersecurity professionals to complete (Bhavnani et al., 2016). 
Additionally, now that all information is digitized, staff must be maintained to organize, 
upkeep, and monitor all digital data (Bhavnani et al., 2016).  
The cost of healthcare has been rising considerably within the last few decades, 
and the average U.S. adult is often unable to compensate for increased expenditure on 
healthcare options. As such, many U.S. adults suffer a variety of consequences that can 
be contributed directly to inadequate coverage and associated issues obtaining treatment 
or medication.  
Consequences of Healthcare Expense 
As the high costs of U.S. healthcare persist, many people are unable to gain 
reliable access to healthcare. According to the WHO, approximately 28 million 
Americans (25%) of all adults within the United States were uninsured in 2016 (WHO, 
2016). As many adults lack healthcare coverage, the number of preventative deaths 
within the United States expect to increase within the next few years (WHO, 2016). 
Woolhandler and Himmelstein (2017) examined Americans that lacked adequate health 
insurance coverage and were able to demonstrate a connection between inadequate 
healthcare coverage and preventative mortality rates. Woolhandler and Himmelstein 
found that it is possible to avoid almost 50,000 deaths on an annual basis if Americans 
had access to healthcare options. Moreover, the risk of mortality is higher in adults than 
in lack of health insurance than within similar cohorts that possess health insurance 
options (Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2017).   
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In addition to preventative mortality, the cost of healthcare within U.S. largely 
contributes to personal debt. According to Scott et al. (2018), the costs of treating injury 
or sickness can lead to high amounts of debt to American adults. Further, the likelihood 
of oppressive debt increases if the condition is chronic or rare as often treatments are 
more expensive (Scott et al., 2018). Increased personal debt is most common within older 
Americans than within younger cohorts (Banegas et al., 2016). Debt is often more 
common with older individuals as they often lived on fixed incomes and possess an 
overall higher prevalence of health issues (Banegas et al., 2016).  
As such, almost 45% of individuals over the age of 65 must declare bankruptcy to 
try and mitigate their respective health care debt (Banegas et al., 2016). The incidence of 
personal bankruptcy claims is similar to the overall population (Scott et al., 2018). When 
examined, the debt accrued through healthcare costs can account for almost 50% of all 
personal bankruptcies within the United States (Scott et al., 2018). As such, the debt 
attributed to treating disease and injury is the highest of all developed nations globally 
(WHO, 2016).  
As the various organization and additional stakeholders comprise the American 
healthcare systems, the cost and associated access to services can vary greatly 
(Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2017). Although the health risks of not gaining access to 
appropriate medical care are significant, there is another risk to the American public 
concerning the healthcare system (Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2017). As the amount of 
sensitive data contained within the databases of the healthcare system is great, the 
possible consequences of inappropriate or unauthorized access can be catastrophic 
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(Abouelmehdi et al., 2018). Files containing confidential medical information, 
sociodemographic data, and billing information are accessible within the cyber 
framework of almost all healthcare systems (Abouelmehdi et al., 2018). As such, 
ensuring these files are adequately protected is essential, and also the implementation of 
cybersecurity. 
Cyber Security 
Cybersecurity is an array of behaviors and actions of information technology (IT) 
experts, including the protection of data from theft, corruption, and interruption (Kimani 
et al., 2019). As reliance on technology increases throughout the country for completion 
of everyday personal and professional tasks, the amount of cyber information must be 
protected increases annually (Kimani et al., 2019). Information protected by 
cybersecurity measures can include any information accessed by the internet, personnel 
files, payment information, identification tools, sociodemographic data, as well as 
personal or private information (Kimani et al., 2019). As the breadth and depth of 
information that requires protection with cybersecurity increases, it should use dynamic 
information protection (Kimani et al., 2019). Cybersecurity tools must be useful in 
identifying a variety of threats and also addresses cyber breaches quickly and 
comprehensively.  
Sensitive data may be vulnerable to cyber breaches in a few different approaches 
by cybercriminals. First, the programs that utilize to store sensitive files may include 
design flaws that allow cybercriminals to access sensitive data more easily (Kimani et al., 
2019). Design flaws found in both the design of the data itself or within the framework in 
45 
 
which it contained (Kimani et al., 2019). Three of the most common types of cyber 
breaches include backdoor, denial-of-service, and direct-access cyber breaches (Kimani 
et al., 2019. 
Common Types of Cyber Breaches 
The first type of vulnerability refers to as a backdoor security breach (Tuptuk & 
Hailes, 2018). Within a backdoor security breach, a cybercriminal is able to bypass 
installed authentication or access restriction protocols (Tuptuk & Hailes, 2018). 
Subsequently, the cybercriminal can access sensitive data in much the same way as 
authorized users (Tuptuk & Hailes, 2018). Often backdoor security breaches are 
indicative of poor design within the data storage program (Tuptuk & Hailes, 2018). As 
such, the flaw in the design of the program often passes through until a backdoor security 
breach occurs (Tuptuk & Hailes, 2018). 
Another type of cybersecurity breach includes a cyber breach called a denial-of-
service attack that largely interrupts the accessibility and functionality of data or data 
storage (Adat et al., 2018) A denial-of-service attack can work in two ways. First, the 
cybercriminal may be able to corrupt the login function on sensitive data that would force 
the intended user to enter the “wrong” password until their login information fails (Adat 
et al., 2018). Similarly, cybercriminals may be able to overload the login capability of 
data storage platforms to disrupt the login capabilities of all authorized users (Adat et al., 
2018).  
The second type of denial-of-service cyber-breach attacks the sensitive data by 
bombarding security measures that protect the data by a collection of “ghost” accounts 
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(Mallela & Jonnalagadda, 2018). Due to this, it becomes incredibly difficult for IT 
professionals and cybersecurity experts to adequately defend the sensitive information 
from the array of simultaneous attacks (Mallela & Jonnalagadda, 2018). Attacks from 
“ghost” accounts can continue until access goes through, as security measures will 
inevitably fail after enough attacks have occurred (Mallela & Jonnalagadda, 2018).  
The third type of cyber-data breach is called a direct-access attack. This type of 
attack occurs when a cybercriminal gains physical access to a computer or other device 
that contains sensitive information (Duffany, 2018). When this occurs, cybercriminals 
can physically modify the device in such a way that securing sensitive data is easier 
(Duffany, 2018). This type of attack may include copying software or access credentials 
(Duffany, 2018). Further cybercriminals can add spy-ware or other software that allows 
the cybercriminal to access data from a remote location (Duffany, 2018). Often when 
direct-access attacks occur, they can infect the rest of the devices that utilize the identical 
platform and can then access increased amounts or levels of sensitive data (Duffany, 
2018). As cyber breaches can occur in varied ways and affect different types of fail-safes 
and security measures, it is imperative to have a comprehensive cybersecurity protocol to 
effectively thwart the efforts of cybercriminals (Mishra et al., 2018). Much of this 
cybersecurity measure involves protocols that integrate well into workplace culture 
(Mishra et al., 2018). In this way, sensitive data can be better protected and ensure that 
data that is sensitive to the organization, consumers, and associated stakeholders remain 
guarded.   
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Integration of Cybersecurity 
 The more integrated cybersecurity measures are into an organization’s workplace 
culture, often, the more effective they are (Li et al., 2019). To ensure that a cybersecurity 
protocol is well integrated, it is necessary to follow five basic steps. First, a pre-
evaluation must occur to bring awareness of possible security breaches to employees. In 
this way, employees become more aware of possible issues with cybersecurity and allow 
employees to feel vested within the protection of sensitive data relevant to their 
organization (Li et al., 2019). Often, when employees feel more integrated with the 
cybersecurity process, they are more likely to adhere to cybersecurity initiatives (Li et al., 
2019). Also, within the pre-evaluation, the cybersecurity measures of the organization 
need to be evaluated to ensure that no obvious faults or shortcomings are observed (Irons 
et al., 2016). The next step includes the implementation and initiation of strategic 
planning sessions that allow the employees to become more aware of current 
cybersecurity protocols and measures within the future (Irons et al., 2016). Within these 
sessions, goals, and deadlines are established to ensure proper integration of 
cybersecurity measures (Irons et al., 2016). After the strategic planning stage, the 
initiation of the integration of cybersecurity measures occurs (Irons et al., 2016). After 
installation and initiation, a post-evaluation process can take place to ensure the 
cybersecurity measures are working correctly and quickly address the problems (Irons et 
al., 2016).  
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Effects of Cyber Breaches 
 A completed cyber breach can negatively impact an organization in a variety of 
ways (Makridis & Dean, 2018). The first way an organization is affected is through theft. 
Theft of data can compromise the personal and financial information of employees, 
consumers, and stakeholders within an organization (Makridis & Dean, 2018). Further, it 
can be costly for an organization to recover or repay stolen funds. The stolen intellectual 
property and ideas implemented elsewhere, causing a loss of revenue for the organization 
(Makridis & Dean, 2018). When this occurs, an organization may lose rights to the stolen 
intellectual property, creating setbacks within research and development (Makridis & 
Dean, 2018). 
 The reputation, or image, of an organization, can also be damaged after a security 
breach (Chen & Jai, 2019). If sensitive data is stolen or distributed by cyber criminals, an 
organization can be held accountable within public opinion (Chen & Jai, 2019). Often, 
consumers blame the organization for not adequately safeguarding sensitive information 
(Chen & Jai, 2019). When this occurs, the services or goods provided by the organization 
may not be used by future customers and lose the business they already possess (Biener 
et al., 2015). This may create a large loss of revenue and trouble with trustworthiness 
long term (Biener et al., 2015). 
 As the U.S. healthcare system is so multifaceted, the organizations affiliated 
amass large amounts of sensitive data that could be harmful if accessed or distributed 
(Martin et al., 2017). It is imperative that such a diverse system be protected from cyber 
breaches to ensure that sensitive data is adequately protected (Martin et al., 2017). When 
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cybersecurity measures fail, the healthcare system can suffer a variety of breaches that 
affect different individuals and different types of data (Martin et al., 2017).  
Summary and Conclusions 
 The purpose of this quantitative, comparative study was to determine if there is a 
significant difference between digital and non digital breaches of individual patient 
records and to determine if there is a significant difference between the number of 
individual patient records breaches for each of the three types of healthcare entities in the 
United States. The examination of digital and non digital breaches amongst the three 
healthcare entities is important to both reducing the number of data breaches and 
ensuring proper allocation of resources to achieve that end. To aid in a more 
comprehensive understanding of how cybersecurity breaches affect individuals within the 
healthcare system of the United States, this chapter contains a literature review. The 
conceptual framework selected for this project was the NIST privacy Framework, which 
explains how cybersecurity breaches occur and in which ways organizations can protect 
themselves and their associated stakeholders. Similarly, the theoretical framework for this 
project is the ecological systems theory, which helps to give context between behaviors 
within the healthcare system and in relation to cybercrimes. This study includes an 
overview of the U.S healthcare system, common types of cyber breaches, and a 
discussion of how cyber breaches can affect organizations. 
In the next chapter, I describe the methodological approach. The framework of 
Chapter 3 includes the methods for sampling, data collection, and subsequent data 
analysis in order to address the research questions associated with this research project. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this quantitative, comparative study was to determine if there is a 
significant difference in the number of individual patient records affected between digital 
and nondigital breaches of individual patient records for each of the three types of U.S. 
health care entities. The examination of digital and nondigital breaches across the three 
types of health care entities is important to both reduce the number of data breaches and 
ensure proper allocation of resources to achieve that end. This chapter includes the 
following key sections (a) research design and rationale, (b) methodology, and (c) threats 
to validity. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key points presented and an 
overview of the succeeding chapters.  
Research Design and Rationale 
In order to address the purpose of the study, I developed the following three main 
research questions: 
RQ1: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health care 
providers? 
RQ2: Is there a significant difference between the number of individual patient 
records affected per digital breach than per nondigital breach for health plan 
providers? 
RQ3: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 




In this study, I used a quantitative method with a comparative design. Quantitative 
methods are used to measure variables or data numerically and objectively and make use 
of statistical techniques to analyze the underlying difference or between and among 
variables or differences between groups based on some variable (Mustafa, 2011). 
Quantitative methods are used to deduce insights from numerically measured and 
statistically tested data in the hope of generalizing the findings to a larger population 
(Allwood, 2012). Therefore, I used a quantitative methodology to enable the 
determination of differences in the number of affected individuals between the types of 
information security breaches (i.e., digital and nondigital) for each of the three types of 
health care entities in the U.S. health care system (i.e., health care providers, health plan 
providers, and health care clearinghouses).  
I used a comparative research design in this study. A comparative research design 
is used to attempt to determine the differences that already exist between or among 
groups of individuals (Gall et al., 2010). This study involved the analysis of individual 
patient records affected for two types of breaches and three types of health care entities, 
which made a comparative design appropriate.  
A comparative design has been used to help to advance knowledge and contribute 
to the body of literature in other similar studies. Rice et al. (2018) examined the gender 
differences that existed in privacy concerns individuals had about unmanned aerial 
systems (colloquially called drones). Like the current study, Rice et al. used quantitative 
data to examine the differences that existed between two or more groups. While Rice et 
al. examined the difference in the Likert score for drone mistrust in men and women, in 
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the current study I examined the differences in the number of individuals affected by data 
breaches by type of breach or type of organization breached.  
Başaran and Hama (2018) used a comparative design to compare and contrast 
faculty members’ views towards cloud computing adoption in higher education. They 
used descriptive statistics and an independent t test to demonstrate that regional 
differences existed in the adoption of cloud computing. Similar to the current study, 
Başaran and Hamma examined quantitative data to ascertain differences across groups. 
While the current study differs from both Rice et al.’s (2018) and Başaran and Hamma’s 
studies in that it examined the number of affected individuals rather than Likert scores, 
the methodology employed was similar in all three studies.  
Methodology  
This study involved the use of historical data available in the public database of 
HIPAA breach and violations (breach portal) maintained by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). I began the data collection upon receiving approval 
from the Walden University Institutional Review Board. 
Population 
The archival section of the breach portal contains a total of 2,441 data breach 
reports from 2009 to February 14, 2018, which is 24 months prior to the present day. 
Reports less than 24 months old are housed in a separate section of the portal because 
they are considered still under investigation. The total population of closed data breach 
reports at the time of this study was 2,441 reports. 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
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This study involved the use of reports beginning in 2010 to the most recent report 
available in the archival section of the breach portal, which was about 2,601 reports. I did 
not consider newer data because the breaches were still under investigation and the 
reports were subject to change. Older data would not work due to the rapid pace of 
technological advancement. Data older than 2015 might not be relevant to the modern 
day due to improvements in technology and data security. I used 100% of the total 
population within the stated timeframes in the current study, so sampling was 
unnecessary. 
Archival Data 
HHS’s breach portal is a publicly available database that can be accessed and 
downloaded online. No permission was needed to access the data because it is freely 
available to anyone who wants to use it. HHS investigates the reports submitted by 
individual entities and posts the results of their findings in the data breach portal. The 
portal includes the following information: name of the breached entity, state the entity 
resides in, entity type, individuals affected, breach submission date, type of breach, 
location of breached information, if a business associate is present, and a text description 
of the incident. For this study, I obtained data from the HHS breach portal in the form of 
a Microsoft Excel document and truncated the unnecessary data (i.e., name of the entity, 
date of the breach, state the entity resides in, and if a business associate is present).  
Operationalization of Variables  
I used statistical pacakage for the social sciences (SPSS) to analyze the study data 
to address the primary research questions in this study. To test the hypotheses for each of 
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the research questions, I ran a two-sample t test for the difference in the means of two 
independent variables. If the t test indicated that there was no statistical difference 
between the two means, I failed to reject the null hypothesis. If there was a statistically 
significant difference in the two means, I rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis. 
Threats to Validity  
In this section, I consider threats to validity that may have affected the current 
study. These threats include those related to external validity, internal validity, and 
construct validity as well as ethical considerations. I addressed these issues before data 
collection and throughout the study process.  
External Validity 
 I conducted this study in the United States using data from the HHS breach portal. 
While data breaches in the United States may be similar in nature to data breaches in 
other countries, it is safer to assume that the findings presented in the current study relate 
only to the United States. Because data from the data breach portal are from all 50 states, 
the findings of this study should apply to all states within the United States. However, 
while many cybercrimes are federal offenses, states also have corresponding or 
supplementary state laws related to cybercrime (Jarrett et al., 2009). This may mean that 
some states are more or less susceptible to cybercrime. I have not taken this into account 
in the current study.  
Internal Validity  
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While I used the entire breach data set available from the HHS breach portal, 
there is still a possibility of selection bias. The data contained in the breached database 
only includes incidents that affected 500 or more individuals. It is possible and likely that 
there are many more breaches that were either ignored or that affected less than 500 
individuals. Therefore, the study results only apply to breaches that are both eventually 
caught and affect more than 500 individuals. 
Additionally, in a few instances, I needed to make a decision whether to include 
or exclude a breach report. A breach report exclusion occurred when I could not 
determine if the breach is the result of a digital or paper breach. In these cases, personal 
bias may have affected the choices I made despite my efforts to avoid such bias.  
In this study, I did not consider the date of the breach in the analysis of the results. 
It is possible that as technology shifts, types of data breaches may become more or less 
relevant. Therefore, this study is most applicable to the present day and may not remain 
applicable as technology and general practices change.  
As this research involved the use of an open-access database, I had no control 
over how the data were collected or reported. While the database was from a reliable 
source (i.e., the HHS), I was not able to account for any errors or bias that may have 
occurred while the data were being collected or reported.  
Construct Validity  
 I used a t test to evaluate the study hypotheses for each research question. In order 
to correctly use a t test, the data must be random and normally distributed (Frost, 2019). 
Where this was not the case, I identified the most appropriate statistical test to use.  
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Ethical Procedures  
I did not use any human subjects in this study, meaning that an extensive 
institutional review board review was not necessary. Furthermore, in this study I only 
used information that was freely available online; therefore, the need for the 
confidentiality of participants did not apply to this research. I did not need to ensure the 
informed consent of participants because the study used archival data. However, despite 
not needing to protect the privacy of participants due to the public nature of the data, I did 
not publish the name of any company that experienced a data breach as identified in the 
breach portal. The names of the organizations were not pertinent to the study, so while 
the types of organizations that experienced a data breach were an integral part of the 
study, the name or identifying information of any particular company or organization was 
not included.  
Summary 
The purpose of this quantitative, comparative study was to determine if there is a 
significant difference in the number of individual patient records affected between digital 
and nondigital breaches of individual patient records for each of the three types of U.S. 
health care entities in the United States. nondigitalnondigitalnondigital 
In this study, I used a quantitative method with a comparative design. Quantitative 
methods are used to measure variables or data numerically and objectively and make use 
of statistical techniques to analyze the underlying difference between groups based on 
some variable (Mustafa, 2011). Quantitative methods are also used to deduce insights 
from numerically measured and statistically tested data in the hope of generalizing the 
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findings to a larger population (Allwood, 2012). Therefore, I used a quantitative 
methodology to enable the determination of differences in the number of affected 
individuals between the types of information security breaches (i.e., digital and 
nondigital) for each of the three types of health care entities in the U.S. health care 
system (i.e., health care providers, health plan providers, and health care clearinghouses).  
The major threat to validity in this study was that the data contained in the 
breached database only included incidents that affected 500 or more individuals. It is 
possible and likely that there are many more breaches that either occurred and were 
ignored or that affected less than 500 individuals. Therefore, the study results only apply 
to breaches that are both eventually reported and affect more than 500 individuals. They 




Chapter 4: Results 
 The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if there is a significant 
difference between digital and nondigital breaches of individual patient records for each 
of the three types of U.S. health care entities. The examination of digital and nondigital 
breaches amongst the three health care entities is essential to both reduce the number of 
data breaches and ensure proper allocation of resources to achieve that end. The 
independent variables were the types of information security breaches and health care 
entities, while the dependent variable was the number of breached individual patient 
records. To examine the difference between variables, I used statistical analysis of group 
means to estimate the differences in individual patient records affected between digital 
and nondigital breaches of health data in the three types of health care entities. 
I developed the following research questions and corresponding hypotheses to aid 
in the examination of the impact of digital and nondigital security breaches on individual 
patient records nondigitalfor each of the three types of U.S. health care entities: 
RQ1: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health care 
providers? 
H01: There is no significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care providers.  
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Ha1: There is a significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care providers. 
RQ2: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health 
plan providers? 
H02: There is no significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health plan providers. 
Ha2: There is a significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health plan providers. 
RQ3: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health care 
clearinghouses? 
H03: There is no significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care clearinghouses. 
Ha3: There is a significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care clearinghouses. 
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 This chapter contains a restatement of the data collection procedures. In this 
chapter, I describe the samples and the results of the statistical tests conducted in this 
study. This chapter also includes the results of the hypothesis testing to address the 
research questions posed in the study. This chapter ends with a summary of the key 
results of the study. 
Data Collection 
 I collected data for this study from the historical data available in the public 
database of HIPAA breach and violations (breach portal) maintained by the HHS. HHS’s 
breach portal is a publicly available database that can be accessed and downloaded 
online. No permission was necessary to access the data because it is freely available to 
anyone who wants to use it. HHS investigates the reports submitted by individual entities 
and posts the results of their findings in the data breach portal. The portal includes the 
following information: name of the breached entity, state the entity resides in, entity type, 
individuals affected, breach submission date, type of breach, location of breached 
information, if a business associate is present, and a text description of the incident. For 
this study, I obtained data from the HHS breach portal in the form of a Microsoft Excel 
document and truncated the unnecessary data (i.e., name of the entity, date of the breach, 
state the entity resides in, and if a business associate is present).  
 This study included reports beginning in 2010 to the most recent report available 
in the archival section of the breach portal, a total of 2,601 reports. The data did not 
include newer data because the breaches are still under investigation and the reports are 
thus subject to change. The data did not include data older than 2010 because that data 
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may not be relevant to the modern day due to improvements in technology and data 
security. I used 100% of the total population within the stated timeframes.  
 I imported the data from the database to Microsoft Excel and recoded it into three 
separate sheets for health care providers, health plan providers, and health care clearing 
houses. I imported the resulting data into SPSS Version 25.0 and recoded them to 
numerically represent categorical variables. The type of breach was recoded as 2 for 
nondigital and 1 for digital breach. The individuals affected variable was considered a 
continuous variable.  
Study Results 
 I gathered a total of 2,601 cases from 2010 to 2020 in database and included them 
in the study. The covered entity types have three categories: health care providers, health 
plan providers, and health care clearinghouses. The majority of the cases (n = 1,876, 
72.13%) come under health care providers, followed by healthcare clearinghouses (n = 
376, 14.45%). Finally, there are 349 cases (13.42%) covered by health plan providers. 
 Data on the types of the breach were also collected. The types of breach 
categories include nondigital and digital breaches. Digital breaches include hacking/IT 
incidents, while nondigital breaches include loss, theft, and improper disposal. 
Unauthorized disclosure breaches get reviewed manually to determine if the breach is 
digital or nondigital. Unauthorized disclosures on paper/film locations were considered as 
nondigital, while unauthorized disclosures on email, electronic medical records, network 
servers, and desktop computers were considered as digital breaches. 
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 The results of frequencies and percentages showed that 69.59% of the cases were 
digital (n = 1,810) while 39.1% of the cases were nondigital (n = 791). 
 
I performed the descriptive statistics of individuals affected by the breach. 
Because the individuals affected variable was continuous in nature, I used measures of 
central tendencies, such as the mean, standard deviation, and range values, to present the 
data. The minimum number of affected was 500 individuals, while the maximum number 
of affected was 78,800,000 individuals. The mean number of affected is 74,323 
individuals (SD = 1,593,587). 
For the first research question, I performed two samples t-test (i.e., individual 
samples t-test) analyses. The first set of hypotheses considered the type of breach as the 
independent variable, while the individuals affected in the health care providers was the 
dependent variable. The type of breach was recoded into dummy variables for digital and 
nondigital. 
Levene’s test results for equality of variances has a significance of 0.002, based 
on which the hypothesis of equal variances was rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis of unequal variances. 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the health care provider entity. The results showed that the number of 
individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 27,893.63, SD = 
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208,563.29) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 8,917.79, SD = 
57,863.41).  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Raw Number of Individuals Affected Based on the Type of 
Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 1,398 27,893.63 208,563.29 18,712 37,075 
Nondigital 478 8,917.79 57,863.41 4,556 13,280 
Based on this, I conducted an independent samples t test by considering the equal 
variances are not assumed. The results in Table 2 show that there is a significant 
difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital and nondigital 
types of breaches (t = 3.073, p = .002). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant difference between the average 
number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches 
for health care providers. 
Table 2 
Independent Samples t-Test Results of the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 
Type of Breach for Raw Data 
  




























 A histogram of the data helped to identify the skewness of the data. As shown in 
Figure 1, it is evident that the data are very highly skewed. 
Figure 1 
Histogram of Raw Data of Health Care Providers 
 
Because the raw data are highly skewed with a very long tail, I decided to trim the 
upper tail by removing the top 10% of the individual values. The results of the Levene’s 
test for the equality of the variances of the raw data. The level of significance of Levene’s 
test is 0.000, based on which the hypothesis of equal variances was rejected. Table 3 
shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals affected in the health 
care provider entity. The results showed that the number of individuals affected is higher 
for digital types of the breach (M = 4,094.74, SD = 4,590.11) as compared to nondigital 




Descriptive Statistics of the 10% Trimmed Raw Number of Individuals Affected Based on 
the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 1,230 4,094.74 4,590.11 3,879 4,310 
Nondigital 458 2,435.91 3,053.12 2,201 2,671 
Based on the results, as shown in Table 4, I conducted an independent samples t 
test by considering that equal variances are not assumed. The result showed that there is a 
significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital and 
nondigital types of breaches (t = 8.568, p = .000). This also shows that there is sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant difference 
between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital breach and 
nondigital breach for health care providers. In Table 9, the 90% confidence interval for 
digital and nondigital are shown. 
Table 4 
Independent Samples t-Test Results of the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 
Type of Breach for 10% Trimmed Raw Data with 90% Confidence Interval 
  















8.568 1,226.82 0.000 1,658.83 193.60 1,279 2,038.66 
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While comparing this value with the raw data, the value of the 10% trimmed 
value is less skewed. I analyazed a histogram of the data to see the skewness of the data. 
As shown in Figure 2, the skewness is much smaller with the top 10% excluded in 





Histogram When Top 10% of the Values are Excluded  
 
In order to improve this further, the loge of raw data excluding the top 10% of the 
values is considered. Since the trimmed data are still highly skewed, I decided to consider 
loge transformation.  
As shown in Table 5, the loge of the raw data excluding top 10% was analyzed 
for the equality of the variances. Levene’s test for equality of variances had a significance 
of 0.002, based on which the null hypothesis of equal variances was rejected. 
Table 5 
Independent Samples t-Test Results of the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 




of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
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45.310 .000 8.204 984.1
14 
0.000 0.41310 0.05035 0.31429 0.51191 
Based on this, as shown in Table 6, the independent samples t-test was conducted 
by considering the equal variances are not assumed. The result showed that there is a 
significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital and 
nondigital types of breaches (t = 8.204, p = .000). This shows that there is sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant difference 
between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital breach and 
nondigital breach for healthcare providers. 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics of the Loge of 10% trimmed Raw Number of Individuals Affected 
Based on the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 1,230 7.7622 1.05 7.7130 7.8115 
Nondigital 458 7.3491 0.87 7.2821 7.4155 
 
Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the healthcare provider entity. The results showed that for the loge scale, the 
number of individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 7.7622, SD = 
1.05) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 7.3491, SD = 0.87). To bring 
this back to the original scale, the exponential of the mean values of digital and nondigital 
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breaches in the healthcare entity was obtainted and the results are displayed in Table 13. 
The results of the original highly skewed raw data for digital types of the breach (90% 
lower CI = 18712, 90% upper CI = 37075) as compared to nondigital types of the breach 
(90% lower CI = 4556, 90% upper CI = 13280). Whereas after the exponential of the 
loge of the 10% trimmed data for digital types of the breach (90% lower CI = 2237, 90% 
upper CI = 2469) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (90% lower CI = 1454, 
90% upper CI = 1663). 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics of the Exponential of Loge of 10% Trimmed Raw Number of 
Individuals Affected Based on the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Individuals affected Digital 1,230 2,350.07 2237.06 2,468.79 
Nondigital 458 1,554.8 1454.03 1,662.54 
In Table 7, the 90% confidence interval for digital and nondigital are shown. 
shown in Figure 3, there is skewness in the histogram with the loge of the top 10% 
excluded data. However, the skewness is lower on loge scale than the original scale. 
 
Figure 3 




 The last set of confidence intervals shown in Table 13 are the shortest confidence 
intervals, as they are based on the loge transformation which yields the best histograms 
shown in Figure 3. This graph still shows some skewness in the two histograms, but it is 
much smaller than those based on the raw data. In addition, the normal probability curve 
shows the typical patten for both the breaches. For the digital breaches, the average 
frequency is around 50, whereas the average frequency is at 25 for the nondigital 
breaches as shown in Figure 3. 
 In Table 8, the summary is shown with the difference based on the raw data, top 
10% trimmed data, and the transformed data. These values come from the Tables 1, 3, 
and 6. It is evident that the trimming of the top 10% data and the transformation helped to 
make the data less skewed, as shown in Figure 3. 
Table 8 
Summary Table for Healthcare Providers 
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Type of Breach Digital  Nondigital 
Raw Data Mean 27,894 8,918 
90% Lower Limit 18,712 4,556 
90% Upper Limit 37,075 13,280 
 Width of 90% CI 18,363 8,724 
10% Trimmed 
Data 
Mean 4,095 2,436 
90% Lower Limit 3,879 2,201 
90% Upper Limit 4,310 2,671 
 Width of 90% CI 431 470 
Transformed Data Mean 2,350 1,555 
90% Lower Limit 2,236 1,454 
90% Upper Limit 2,469 1,663 
 Width of 90% CI 233 209 
As shown in Table 8, the width of the 90% confidence interval has narrowed 
considerably by transforming the data. As the significance of the tests shown in Tables 1, 
3, and 6 is 0.000, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital breaches 
and nondigital breaches for healthcare providers. 
For the second research question, two samples t-test (individual samples t-test) 
analyses were performed. The second set of hypotheses considered the type of breach as 
the independent variable while the individuals affected in the health plan providers as the 
dependent variable. The type of breach was recoded into dummy variables for digital and 
nondigital. 
The results of Levene’s test for equality of variances has a significance of 0.016, 
based on which the hypothesis of equal variances was rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis of unequal variances. 
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 Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the healthcare provider entity. The results showed that the number of 
individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 616,066.07, SD = 
6032878.13) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 24,935.24, SD = 
132296.62).  
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics of the Raw Number of Individuals Affected Based on the Type of 
Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 176 616,066.07 6,032,878.13 1,135,904 1,368,036 
Nondigital 172 24,935.24 132,296.62 8,252 41,618 
Based on this, an independent samples t-test was conducted by considering the 
equal variances are not assumed. The results in Table 10 showed that there is a significant 
difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital and nondigital 
types of breaches (t = 1.30, p = .195). Therefore, there is no sufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis, which stated that there is significant difference between the average 
number of individual patient records affected for digital breach and nondigital breach for 
health plan providers. 
Table 10 
Independent Samples t-Test Result for the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 
Type of Breach for Raw Data 

















1.30 175.17 0.195 591,130.82 454,857.17 -161,020 1,343,282 
 The histogram of the data helped to identify the skewness of the data. As shown 
in Figure 4, it is evident that the data are very highly skewed.  
Figure 4 
Histogram of Raw Data Health Plan Providers 
 
Because the data are highly skewed with a very long tail, I decided to trim the 
upper tail by removing the top 10% of the individual values. The results of the Levene’s 
test for the equality of the variances of the raw data. The signidviance of Levene’s test is 
0.000, based on which the hypothesis of equal variances was rejected. 
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Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the health plan provider entity. The results showed that the number of 
individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 6458.78, SD = 8766.68) 
as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 4001.19, SD = 5386.52). 
Table 11  
Descriptive Statistics of the 10% Trimmed Raw Number of Individuals Affected Based on 
the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 152 6,458.78 8,766.68 5,282 7,636 
Nondigital 161 4,001.19 5,386.52 3,299 4,704 
Based on this, as shown in Table 12, the independent samples t-test was 
conducted by considering that equal variances are not assumed. The result showed that 
there is a significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in 
digital and nondigital types of breaches (t = 2.968, p = .003). This shows that there is 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant 
difference between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital 
breach and nondigital breach for health plan providers. In Table 9, the 90% confidence 




Independent Samples t-Test Result for the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 
Type of Breach for 10% Trimmed Raw Data With 90% Confidence Interval 
  


























0.003 2,457.60 828.15 1,090 3,825 
While comparing this value with the raw data, the value of the 10% trimmed 
value is less skewed. The histogram of the data was analyzed to see the skewness of the 
data. As shown in Figure 5, the skewness is much better with the top 10% excluded in 
comparison to the original raw data. 
Figure 5 




In order to improve this further, the loge of raw data excluding the top 10% of the 
values is considered. Since the trimmed data are still highly skewed, I decided to consider 
loge transformation.  
As shown in Table 13, the loge of the raw data excluding top 10% was analyzed for the 
equality of the variances. Levene’s test for equality of variances had a significance of 
0.003, based on which the null hypothesis of equal variances was rejected. 
Table 13 
Independent Samples t-Test Result for the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 





Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
















1.252 .264 2.979 311 0.003 0.39061 0.13114 0.17425 0.60696 
Based on this, as shown in Table 14, the independent samples t-test was 
conducted by considering the equal variances are not assumed. The result showed that 
there is a significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in 
digital and nondigital types of breaches (t = 2.979, p = 0.000). This shows that there is 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant 
difference between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital 
breach and nondigital breach for healthcare providers. 
Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics of the Loge of 10% Trimmed Raw Number of Individuals Affected 
Based on the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 152 8.0242 1.215 7.8611 8.1873 
Nondigital 161 7.6336 1.105 7.4895 7.7777 
Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the healthcare provider entity. The results showed that for the loge scale the 
number of individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 8.0242, SD = 
1.215) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 7.6336, SD = 1.105). To bring 
this back to the original scale, the exponential of the mean values of digital and nondigital 
breaches in the health plan provider entity was obtained and the results are displayed in 
Table 24. The results of the original highly skewed raw data for digital types of the 
breach (90% lower CI = -1135904, 90% upper CI = 1368036) as compared to nondigital 
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types of the breach (90% lower CI = 8,252, 90% upper CI = 41,518). Whereas after the 
exponential of the loge of the 10% trimmed data for digital types of the breach (90% 
lower CI = 2592, 90% upper CI = 3605) as compared to nondigital types of the breach 
(90% lower CI = 1790, 90% upper CI = 2392). 
Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics of the Exponential of Loge of 10% Trimmed Raw Number of 
Individuals Affected Based on the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N Mean 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 152 3053.98 2592 3605 
Nondigital 161 2066.48 1790 2392 
In Table 15, the 90% confidence interval for digital and nondigital are shown. As 
shown in Figure 6, there is skewness in the histogram with the loge of the top 10% 
excluded data. However, the skewness is lower on loge scale than the original scale. 
Figure 6 




 The last set of confidence intervals shown in Table 15 are the shortest confidence 
intervals, as they are based on the loge transformation which yields the best histograms 
shown in Figure 6. This graph still shows some skewness in the two histograms, but it is 
much smaller than those based on the raw data. In addition, the normal probability curve 
shows the typical pattern for both the breaches. For the digital breaches, the average 
frequency is around 10, whereas the average frequency is at 12 for the nondigital 
breaches as shown in Figure 6.  
 In Table 16, the summary is shown with the difference based on the raw data, top 
10% trimmed data, and the transformed data. These values come from the Tables 9, 11, 
and 14. It is evident that the trimming of the top 10% data and the transformation helped 
to make the data less skewed, as shown in Figure 6. 
Table 16 
Summary Table for Health Plan Providers 
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Type of Breach Digital  Nondigital 




90% Upper Limit 1,368,036 41,618 
 Width of 90% CI 2,503,940 33,366 
10% Trimmed 
Data 




90% Upper Limit 7,636 4,704 
 Width of 90% CI 2,354 1,405 




90% Upper Limit 3,605 2,392 
 Width of 90% CI 13 602 
As shown in Table 16, the width of the 90% confidence interval has narrowed 
considerably by transforming the data. As the significance of the tests shown in Tables 9, 
11, and 14 is 0.003, I reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference 
between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital breaches 
and nondigital breaches for health plan providers. 
For the third research question, two samples t-test (individual samples t-test) 
analyses were performed. The first set of hypotheses considered the type of breach as the 
independent variable while the individuals affected in the healthcare clearinghouses as 




Levene’s test results for equality of variances has a significance of 0.05, based on 
which the hypothesis of equal variances was considered in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis of equal variances. 
Table 17 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the healthcare provider entity. The results showed that the number of 
individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 27893.63, SD = 
208563.29) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 8917.79, SD = 57863.41).  
Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics of the Raw Number of Individuals Affected Based on the Type of 
Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 235 122204.93 586984.84 58972 185438 
Nondigital 141 60611.07 441603.22 -968 122190 
 
Based on this, an independent samples t-test was conducted by considering the 
equal variances are not assumed. The results in Table 28 showed that there is a significant 
difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital and nondigital 
types of breaches (t = 1.154, p = .249). Therefore, there is no sufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis, which stated that there is significant difference between the average 





Independent Samples t-Test Result for the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 
Type of Breach for Raw Data 
  















1.154 355.29 0.249 61,593.86 53,378.36 -26,435 149,623 
 The histogram of the data helped to identify the skewness of the data. As shown 
in Figure 7, it is evident that the data are very highly skewed. 
Figure 7 
Histogram of Raw Data of Health Care Clearing Houses 
 
Because the raw data are highly skewed with a very long tail, I decided to trim the 
upper tail by removing the top 10% of the individual values. Table 29 shows the results 
83 
 
of the Levene’s test for the equality of the variances of the raw data. The significance of 
Levene’s test is 0.000, based on which the hypothesis of equal variances was rejected. 
Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the healthcare provider entity. The results showed that the number of 
individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 6,986.52, SD = 
9,023.08) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 4,592.81, SD = 5,935.37). 
Table 19 
Descriptive Statistics of the 10% Trimmed Raw Number of Individuals Affected Based on 
the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 208 6,986.52 9,023.08 5,953 8,020 
Nondigital 130 4,592.81 5,935.37 3,730 5,455 
Based on this, as shown in Table 20, the independent samples t-test was 
conducted by considering that equal variances are not assumed. The result showed that 
there is a significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in 
digital and nondigital types of breaches (t = 2.941, p = .003). This also shows that there is 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant 
difference between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital 
breach and nondigital breach for healthcare clearinghouses. In Table 29, the 90% 




Independent Samples t-Test Result for the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 
Type of Breach for 10% Trimmed Raw Data With 90% Confidence Interval 
  















2.941 335.103 0.003 1,658.83 193.60 1,279 2,038.66 
While comparing this value with the raw data, the value of the 10% trimmed 
value is less skewed. The histogram of the data was analyzed to see the skewness of the 
data. As shown in Figure 8, the skewness is much better with the top 10% excluded in 





Histogram of Top 10% Excluded Data 
 
 
In order to improve this further, the loge of raw data excluding the top 10% of the 
values is considered. Since the trimmed data are still highly skewed, I decided to consider 
loge transformation.  
As shown in Table 21, the loge of the raw data excluding top 10% was analyzed 
for the equaity of the variances. Levene’s test for equality of variances had a significance 
of 0.007, based on which the null hypothesis of equal variances was rejected. 
Table 21 
Independent Samples t-Test Result for the Number of Individuals Affected Based on the 






of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 














45.310 .181 2.726 289 0.007 0.35242 0.12930 0.13906 0.56578 
Based on this, as shown in Table 22, the independent samples t-test was 
conducted by considering the equal variances are not assumed. The result showed that 
there is a significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in 
digital and nondigital types of breaches (t = 2.726, p = .007). This shows that there is 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant 
difference between the average number of individual patient records affected for digital 
breach and nondigital breach for healthcare providers. 
Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics of the Loge of 10% Trimmed Raw Number of Individuals Affected 
Based on the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M SD 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 208 8.1367 1.21 7.9980 8.2754 
Nondigital 130 7.7843 1.12 7.6214 7.9472 
Table 22 shows the descriptive statistics of the original number of individuals 
affected in the healthcare provider entity. The results showed that for the loge scale the 
number of individuals affected is higher for digital types of the breach (M = 8.1367, SD = 
1.21) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (M = 7.7843, SD = 1.12). To bring 
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this back to the original scale, the exponential of the mean values of digital and nondigital 
breaches in the healthcare entity was obtained and the results are displayed in Table 35. 
The results of the original highly skewed raw data for digital types of the breach (90% 
lower CI = 58972, 90% upper CI = 185438) as compared to nondigital types of the 
breach (90% lower CI = -968, 90% upper CI = 122190). Whereas after the exponential of 
the loge of the 10% trimmed data for digital types of the breach (90% lower CI = 2981, 
90% upper CI = 3944) as compared to nondigital types of the breach (90% lower CI = 
2039, 90% upper CI = 2836). 
Table 23 
Descriptive Statistics of the Exponential of Loge of 10% Trimmed Raw Number of 
Individuals Affected Based on the Type of Breach 
Type of Breach N M 
Lower 
90% CI 
Upper   90% 
CI 
Digital 208 3417.62 2981 3944 
Nondigital 130 2402.58 2039 2836 
In Table 23, the 90% confidence interval for digital and nondigital are shown.. As 
shown in Figure 9, there is skewness in the histogram with the loge of the top 10% 
excluded data. However, the skewness is lower on loge scale than the original scale. 
Figure 9 




 The last set of confidence intervals shown in Table 23 are the shortest confidence 
intervals, as they are based on the loge transformation, which yields the best histograms 
shown in Figure 9. This graph still shows some skewness in the two histograms, but it is 
much smaller than those based on the raw data. In addition, the normal probability curve 
shows the typical pattern for both breaches. For the digital breaches, the average 
frequency is around 12, whereas the average frequency is at 8 for the nondigital breaches 
as shown in Figure 9.  
 In Table 24, the summary is shown with the difference based on the raw data, top 
10% trimmed data, and the transformed data. These values come from the Tables 17, 19, 
and 22. It is evident that the trimming of the top 10% data and the transformation helped 
to make the data less skewed, as shown in Figure 3. 
Table 24 
Summary Table for Healthcare Clearinghouses 
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Type of Breach Digital  Nondigital 
Raw Data Mean 122,205 60,611 
90% Lower Limit 58,972 -968 
90% Upper Limit 185,438 122,190 
 Width of 90% CI 126,466 123,158 
10% Trimmed 
Data 
Mean 6,983 4,593 
90% Lower Limit 5,953 3,730 
90% Upper Limit 8,020 5,455 
 Width of 90% CI 2,067 1,725 
Transformed Data Mean 3,418 2,403 
90% Lower Limit 2,981 2,039 
90% Upper Limit 3,944 2,836 
 Width of 90% CI 963 797 
As shown in Table 36, the width of the 90% confidence interval has narrowed 
considerably by transforming the data. As the significance of the tests shown in Table 22 
is 0.007, I reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the 
average number of individual patient records affected for digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for healthcare clearinghouses.  
Summary 
 The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if there was a significant 
statistical difference between digital and nondigital breaches of individual patient records 
for each of the three types of healthcare entities in the United States. The examination of 
digital and nondigital breaches amongst the three healthcare entities is essential to both 
reducing the number of data breaches and ensuring proper allocation of resources to 
achieve that end. This study included reports beginning in 2010 to the most recent report 
available in the archival section of the breach portal, which was a total of 2,601 reports. 
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 Most of the cases (n = 1876, 72.13%) were covered with healthcare providers, 
followed by healthcare clearinghouses (n = 376, 14.45%), and 349 cases (13.42%) were 
covered by health plan providers. When it comes to the healthcare providers, there is a 
significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital and 
nondigital types of breaches (t = 8.204, p = .000). For the health plan providers, there is a 
significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital and 
nondigital types of breaches (t = 2.979, p = .003). For the healthcare clearinghouses, there 
is a  significant difference between the average number of individuals affected in digital 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if there is a significant 
difference between digital and nondigital breaches of individual patient records for each 
of the three types of U.S. health care entities. The results of this study are significant 
because understanding the differences between digital and nondigital breaches among the 
three types of health care entities can lead to information that can be used to reduce the 
overall number of breaches and better protect patient data. Furthermore, understanding 
the types of breaches that occur is useful in determining an appropriate allocation of 
security funding. 
 Chapter 4 contained the study findings. The present study uncovered several key 
findings related to health care data security breaches. First, 69.59% of all data breaches 
were digital (n = 1,810), while 30.41% of the cases were nondigital (n = 791). This 
suggests that the majority of data breaches were digital in origin. The number of breaches 
that occurred in health care providers is higher when comparing with health plan 
providers or health care clearinghouses.  
RQ1: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health care 
providers? The results of the study were sufficient to reject the null hypothesis for RQ1. 
The null hypothesis for RQ1 stated that there was no significant difference between the 
average number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care providers. 
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RQ2: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health plan 
providers? The results of the study were sufficient to reject the null hypothesis for RQ2. 
The null hypothesis for RQ2 stated there was no significant difference between the 
average number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health plan providers. 
RQ3: Is there a significant difference between the average number of individual 
patient records affected for digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health care 
clearinghouses? The results of the study were sufficient to reject the null hypothesis for 
RQ3. The null hypothesis for RQ3 stated there was no significant difference between the 
average number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care clearinghouses. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The study findings indicated that 72% of all identified data breaches occurred 
through health care providers. Data from health plan providers accounted for 14% of data 
breaches, while 14% of data breaches occurred through health care clearinghouses. 
However, in terms of impact, more patient records are breached in the breaches at health 
plan providers followed by the health care providers and health care clearinghouses. 
Though numerous recent studies discussed security breaches in the context of health care, 
there is a gap in literature regarding the main source of health care data breaches (Martin 
et al., 2017). As previously mentioned, a number of health care-related entities have 
access to patient data, and the repetitious instances of individual private information 
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provides additional opportunities for breaches in security (Martin et al., 2017). However, 
previous studies did not comparatively determine the frequency of breaches across 
various health care agencies. Therefore, the present study extends the literature by 
providing evidence that health care providers may be the most susceptible or the most 
targeted for data breach attacks. 
RQ1 
The major finding of this study was that there is sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis that there was no significant difference between the average number of 
individual patient records affected for digital breaches and nondigital breaches for health 
care providers. This implies that may be a significant difference between the average 
number of individual patient records affected for digital breaches and nondigital breaches 
for healthcare providers. In addition to this major finding, the data related to RQ1 
revealed a number of other findings supported by recent literature.  
 The study findings revealed that 75% of all data breaches occurred digitally, 
while 25% included physical records. The implication that virtual data may be more 
susceptible or more targeted for theft is supported by literature (Kimani et al., 2019). 
Kimani et al. (2019) determined that digital information is vulnerable to attack and more 
security is necessary every year. Kimani et al. found that design flaws within the data or 
the security systems can result in easy access for unauthorized persons, thus making 
digital data susceptible. Additionally, unlike physical data where a person must be 
physically present to access the data, digital data are theoretically accessible by a much 
larger group of individuals looking to obtain it (Kimani et al., 2019). The study findings 
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are, therefore, consistent with recent literature when implying that digital breaches are 
more common than physical breaches. 
The first two findings are related to the type of breach and the type of health care 
organization breached. These findings provide useful background information to the 
major question of RQ1. nondigitalInstead of using all the data, I used the top 10% 
excluded data along with the transformation of log scale to reduce the skewness. The type 
of data breach was the independent variable, while the number of individuals impacted 
was the dependent variable. The results showed that there is a significant difference 
between the average number of individuals affected in digital and nondigital types of 
breaches (t = 8.204, p = .000). This shows that there is sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant difference between the average 
number of individual patient records affected for digital breach and nondigital breach for 
health care providers. 
RQ2 
The major finding of this study related to RQ2 was that there is sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there was no significant difference between the 
average number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health plan providers. This implies there may be a significant difference 
between the average number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and 
nondigital breaches for health plan providers. In addition to this major finding, the data 
related to RQ2 revealed a number of other findings supported by recent literature.  
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 The study findings revealed that 51% of all data breaches for health plan 
providers occurred digitally, while 49% included physical records. This finding suggests 
that the occurances of breaches in the health plan providers are equally distributed among 
the digital breaches and physical breaches. Previous research established that there are a 
number of different public and private agencies with access to sensitive patient 
information (Papanicolas et al., 2018). Additionally, previous research established that 
health care information is susceptible to attack due to its sensitive nature and the 
frequency of information sharing which occurs between health care agencies to ensure 
continuity of patient care (Bhavnani et al., 2016). Combined, the relevant studies revealed 
that there are different types of health care agencies and that the data from the different 
types of agencies is sensitive to theft (Bhavnani et al., 2016). The study findings are, 
therefore, consistent with recent literature when implying the digital and physical 
breaches have major effects on the entity. 
The first two findings are related to the type of breach and the health care 
organization breached. These findings provide useful background information to the 
addressing RQ2nondigital To test the hypothesis, I performed an individual sample t test. 
Instead of using the data, the top 10% excluded data were used along with the 
transformation of log scale to reduce the skewness. The type of data breach was the 
independent variable, while the number of individuals impacted was the dependent 
variable. The results showed that there is a significant difference between the average 
number of individuals affected in digital and nondigital types of breaches (t = 2.979, p = 
.003). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, which stated 
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that there is no significant difference between the average number of individual patient 
records affected by digital breach and nondigital breach for health plan providers. 
RQ3  
The major finding of this study related to RQ3 was that there is sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there was no significant difference between the 
average number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and nondigital 
breaches for health care clearinghouses. This implies that may be a significant difference 
between the average number of individual patient records affected by digital breaches and 
nondigital breaches for health care clearinghouses. In addition to this major finding, the 
data related to RQ3 revealed a number of other findings supported by recent literature.  
 The study findings revealed that 63% of all data breaches through health care 
clearinghouse occurred digitally, while 37% included physical records.The implication 
that virtual data may be more susceptible or more targeted for theft is supported by 
literature (Kimani et al., 2019). Kimani et al. (2019) determined that digital information 
is vulnerable to attack and more security is required every year. Kimani et al. found that 
design flaws within the data or the security systems can result in easy access for 
unauthorized persons, thus making digital data susceptible. Additionally, unlike physical 
data where a person must be physically present to access the data, digital data are 
theoretically accessible to a much larger group of individuals looking to obtain it (Kimani 
et al., 2019). The study findings are, therefore, consistent with recent literature when 
implying that digital breaches are more common than physical breaches. 
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The first two findings are related to the type of breach and the health care 
organization breached. These findings provide useful background information to the 
major question of RQ3. nondigitalInstead of using all the data, I used the top 10% 
excluded data along with the transformation of log scale to reduce the skewness. The type 
of data breach was the independent variable, while the number of individuals impacted 
was the dependent variable. The results showed that there is a significant difference 
between the average number of individuals affected in digital and nondigital types of 
breaches (t = 2.726, p = .007). Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis, which stated that there is no significant difference between the average 
number of individual patient records affected for digital breach and nondigital breach for 
health care clearinghouses. 
 This finding is significant because it extends and partially refutes recent literature 
on health care breaches (Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2017). Woolhandler and 
Himmelstein (2017) found that health care databases contained mass amounts of sensitive 
personal data, including medical records, payment records, and personal identification 
data. Woolhandler and Himmelstein reported that the sheer quantity of data available 
digitally meant that there was a large opportunity for individuals looking to access a vast 
number of medical records. Though the study results indicate that more breaches 
occurred more often digitally than physically, the data results do not imply that the 
magnitude of the digital security breaches was greater than the physical security 
breaches. When combined, the study findings related to the three research questions 
extends literature by implying that, while there may be a greater opportunity for theft 
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through digital channels, the magnitude of the digital theft may not be higher than the 
magnitude of physical theft. 
Limitations of the Study 
 There are several limitations associated with the study. Firstly, I gathered and 
utilized the data from databases of government agencies. While these databases provide a 
robust and accessible dataset, using one specific source for data breach records could 
have affected the findings. Though I sought to establish protocols that would ensure the 
included sample was unbiased, the results may not apply to all organizations given the 
various funding streams and record-keeping methodologies utilized. 
There were two other limitations to the study. First, the variables were from 
databases of government agencies. This sample might have limited the insights gathered 
from the analysis as the data might not have reflected the general population. Second, the 
use of a nonprobability sampling procedure, such as purposive sampling, reduces the 
possibility of generalizing the results to a larger population. Though these limitations 
prevent the study findings from applying universally to all types of breaches, agencies, 
and patient groups, the results do provide useful information for practitioners regarding 
data security and data security prioritization. 
Recommendations 
 Woolhandler and Himmelstein (2017) found that healthcare databases contained 
large amounts of sensitive personal data, including medical records, payment records, and 
personal identification data. This study results indicated that data breaches occurred both 
digitally and nondigitally. Recent literature on the topic of data breaches within a 
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healthcare context focused on digital data breaches (Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2017). 
the study results indicated that, while digital data breaches were more common than 
physical data breaches, given the observed presence of nondigital data breaches and the 
impact of such breaches, future research could focus on determining how healthcare 
agencies can secure physical files in a decade when the focus is on digital security 
(Woolhandler & Himmelstein, 2017). 
 The study results indicated that a greater number of individuals were impacted 
due to health plan data breaches as opposed to health clearing house breaches and 
healthcare provider breaches. Though this result was established through the study, the 
study results did not indicate why health plan provider undergo huge record breaches 
compared to the other two entities. Future research could establish why more physical 
breaches are occurring with health plan providers as opposed to the other healthcare 
entities. 
Implications 
 Based on the study results, I recommend that health plan providers review 
practices related to physical security as much as they allocate their budget for the digital 
security. The study results revealed that more individuals were impacted by digital data 
breaches from healthcare providers than from health plan providers or healthcare 
clearinghouses. It is recommended that individuals involved with data security at 
healthcare providers consider protocols for reducing security breach events and the 
magnitude of events should they occur. 
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 Data security officials at healthcare organizations have more information on how 
to prioritize security spending. The study results indicate that more breaches occurred 
digitally, so security officials should consider whether it is appropriate to invest a greater 
proportion of funds towards preventing digital breaches as opposed to nondigital 
breaches However, the study results also indicated that nondigital breaches did still occur, 
and there was a significant difference in the number of individuals impacted. This 
information implies that the information security team in the healthcare entities should 
consider these facts when allocating their budget for digital and nondigital security. 
 The healthcare cost savings would result in positive social change. If healthcare 
agencies could implement protocols for improved data security and data management, it 
is possible that fewer data breaches would occur. Fewer data breaches would positively 
impact society by reducing losses associated with identity theft and theft of financial 
information. Furthermore, a reduction in data security breaches would benefit healthcare 
providers through an increase in reputation and a decrease in legal claims associated with 
data breaches. 
Conclusion 
 The study results indicated that more breaches occurred digitally than 
nondigitally, but that the impact of the breaches was significantly associated with the type 
of breach. Additionally, the study found that health plan provider breaches resulted in a 
greater number of individuals impacted per incident. The study results both supported 
and extended recent literature on healthcare security breaches. Based on the study results 
and recent literature, future literature could focus on understanding physical breaches in 
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the modern era. Additionally, future research could consider why health plan providers 
appear to have larger breaches than other types of healthcare institutions. The study has 
positive implications for social change such as the possibility of providing health security 
officers with valuable information related to security prioritizations. Reducing security 
breaches would benefit individuals by reducing the harm associated with financial and 
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